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When History Outweighs Law:
Extinguishment of Abenaki Aboriginal Title
JOHN P. LOWNDES
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of aboriginal title, by which many American Indian
tribes hold possessory rights to their traditional lands, was re-
cently dealt a serious blow by a Vermont Supreme Court decision. In
State v. Elliott,' the Vermont court held that the title of the Abenaki
tribe to its ancestral lands in northwestern Vermont had been ex-
tinguished by what it called "the increasing weight of history."2 This
controversial decision' marks a clear departure from the long-
standing aboriginal title doctrine expounded in the early nineteenth
century by Chief Justice John Marshall and the United States Su-
preme Court.' The Vermont court's decision not only breaks with the
rule that a tribe must consent to extinguishment of its aboriginal ti-
tle,5 but also rejects the requirement that the dominant sovereign
must express its intent to extinguish title with a "plain and unam-
biguous action."' The Vermont Supreme Court's holding that the
"increasing weight of history" alone can terminate Indian title dis-
poses of the rule of law, and replaces it with a selective reading of
the conqueror's history.
This Article focuses on the issues surrounding Indian, or
"aboriginal," title, particularly the right of the sovereign to extin-
guish aboriginal title. It examines the Elliott court's "increasing
weight of history" theory, and demonstrates its incompatibility with
the established law concerning aboriginal title. Part I discusses
Abenatd history in upper New England and the tribe's relations
with immigrating non-Indians from the time of first European con-
tact to the present. Part II traces the development of aboriginal title
and extinguishment doctrine from its first articulation by the Mar-
l. State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993).
2. Id. at 218.
3. See Judith Gaines, The Supreme Court Rejects Abenaki Appeal, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 23, 1993 (Metro) at 17 (describing the decision as a "major blow to the fight for Na-
tive American self-determination" and quoting Hopi lawyer and co-founder of the Indian
Bar Association Frances Jue as saying the decision is a "further erosion of tribal sover-
eignty").
4. See discussion infra sections II.B-f.D.1.
5. See discussion infra section II.D.
6. See discussion infra section H.E.
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shall Court through its elaboration in significant cases over the
course of more than 180 years.
Part III analyzes Elliott and compares its holdings with the
aboriginal title standards first established by the Marshall Court
and upheld by the Supreme Court as recently as 1985.1 Part III ar-
gues that the historical standard used in Elliott is really no stan-
dard at all. Because it permits such flexibility of interpretation, this
standard allows the court to find extinguishment in a series of
events that individually would not rise to that level. Finally, the Ar-
ticle argues that the "increasing weight of history" rule abandons
aboriginal title doctrine by ignoring the extinguishment touchstones
of clear sovereign intent and Indian consent. The "increasing weight
of history" test imposes a standard that American Indians can rarely
meet, and is itself a conclusion which repudiates the doctrine of
aboriginal title. For these reasons, courts which hereafter consider
aboriginal title cases should take the opportunity to expressly reject
Vermont's "increasing weight of history" rule as an unsound and
dangerous departure from aboriginal title doctrine.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Missisquoi Abenakis are a tribe of about 2,600 living
mainly in northwest Vermont near the shores of Lake Champlain,
not far from the Canadian border.8 Though they have participated in
federal Indian programs and have received federal funds,9 the
Abenakis are not a federally recognized tribe and they do not live on
a demarcated reservation.10 Most live in the predominantly white
towns of Swanton, Highgate, and St. Albans." Vermont popular lore
has long characterized the Abenakis as nomads from Canada and
relative newcomers to the area. 12 This myth was cultivated by eight-
eenth-century land speculators like Revolutionary War hero Ethan
Allen, who had everything to lose and nothing to gain by recognizing
7. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (Oneida II).
8. State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 32 (Vt. Dist. Ct., Franklin Cir.
Aug. 11, 1989).
9. Id. at 33 (noting that the Abenakis created the Abenaki Self-Help Association
[ASHAI] in the early 1970's, and through that organization have received federal funds
designated exclusively for American Indians. Abenaki Acres is a low-income housing pro-
ject that was jointly conceived by the Missisquoi tribe and ASHAI).
10. Robert Lucido, Aboriginal Title: Abenaki Indian Land Claim in Vermont, 16 VT.
L. REv. 611, 623-25 (1992).
11. St. Francis, slip op. at 32. It is estimated that eighty to ninety percent of the
Missisquoi Abenakis currently live in their traditional homeland. Id. In the Back Bay
neighborhood of Swanton, forty to sixty percent of the population is Abenaki. Id.
12. See Fishing Case Unites Divided Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1987, § 1, at 24
(stating that Vermont does not recognize the Abenakis as a tribe and that Vermonters
have long maintained that the Abenakis were visitors, not settlers, in their state).
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the Abenakis' ancient land claims.13 The Abenakis also fueled this
misapprehension with their hard-learned survival strategy of "going
underground" to avoid conflict with European colonists and armies. 14
In the past decade, however, historians have debunked the
myth of the latecoming or disappearing Abenaki. 5 Archeological,
anthropological, and archival research shows that the Abenakis and
their forebears have continuously occupied the area for 11,000
years. 6 Abenakis and related tribes once densely settled northern
New England, 7 with the Abenakis numbering perhaps 10,000 in
Vermont and western New Hampshire in 1600.18 Allied with the
French, the Abenakis launched devastating raids from their Missis-
quoi village against encroaching English settlers in the early
13. See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE WESTERN ABENAMIS OF VERMONT, 1600-1800 225-
30 (1990) [hereinafter GALLOWAY] (describing the efforts of Ethan Allen, leader of the fa-
bled Green Mountain Boys, and his brother Ira, both immigrants from Connecticut heav-
ily invested in Vermont real estate, to dispossess the Abenakis of their Missisquoi home-
land). In the 1780's and 1790's, Ethan Allen kept pressure on the New Hampshire gover-
nor to deny Abenaki land rights in Swanton, claiming that the Abenakis were invaders
from Canada. Id. at 225-26. To punctuate this claim Allen called the Missisquoi Abenakis
"St. Francis Indians" after a French Catholic mission across the border in Quebec where
many Abenakis lived. Id. at 228. Nevertheless, large numbers of Abenakis were reported
to have remained in open occupation of the lands around Swanton into the 1790's. Id. at
230.
14. See St. Francis, slip op. at 17 (stating that "[iun dealing with Europeans the
Missisquoi have tried to remain as inconspicuous as possible, dealing through a few front
families"); see also CALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 226 (observing that the Abenakis' for-
merly successful method of "strategic withdrawal" disserved them in the late 1700's by
fostering the impression that they had abandoned their lands); Peter Anderson, We Want
Vermont, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1990 (Magazine) at 20 (observing that a historian tes-
tified at the fish-in trial that the Abenakis periodically went "underground" to avoid
European-introduced contagious diseases and conflict).
Homer St. Francis, the Abenaki Chief, and Gabor Rona, a lawyer for the tribe, both
contend that the state sponsored forced sterilization of the Abenakis in the 1930's during
the "eugenics" craze and that many families "disappeared." Id. This abuse drove Abenakis
further underground and finally extinguished the use of their language for fear of being
singled out and persecuted. Id.
15. See St. Francis, slip op. at 12 (stating that the "'ethnocentric historical jugger-
naut' that pressed for a conclusion that the Missisquoi had abandoned their homeland
was fueled by fantasy"); see also Abenakis Vote in Crucial Election, UPI, Sept. 11, 1987,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file (noting that until recently, historians be-
lieved the Abenakis were newcomers, though new scholarship demonstrates that they are
the area's oldest settlers); see generally CALLOWAY, supra note 13; COLIN G. CALLOWAY,
DAWNLAND ENCOUNTERS: INDIANS AND EUROPEANS IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND (1991).
16. State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 214 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993);
see also CALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 6-10.
17. Lucido, supra note 10, at 630.
18. CALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 10. In addition to the Missisquoi, Abenaki groups
inhabiting the region included the Sokokis, Cowasucks, Pennacooks, Winnipesaukees,
and Pigwackets. Collectively, these groups are known as the western Abenakis. Id. at 7.
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1700's. 19 They played an important role in the French and Indian
War2" and fought on both sides in the American Revolution.2 ' There-
after, the Abenaki population declined precipitously due to war, dis-
ease, and heavy non-Indian immigration.22 White settlement even-
tually confined the Abenakis to the small corner of Vermont which
they now occupy.23 The Abenakis, however, never signed a treaty
with the United States government surrendering any of their ances-
tral lands in Vermont.'
Beginning in 1979, many Abenakis finally abandoned their low-
profile survival strategy and asserted their sovereignty against the
State of Vermont.' Abenakis staged "fish-ins" on the Missisquoi
River in Swanton, inviting arrest and prosecution from game war-
dens for fishing without a state license.26 The anglers claimed a
traditional right to fish the Missisquoi River, which they maintained
was "Indian country," free from state regulation. Led by a flamboy-
ant and confrontational chief,27 Abenakis also served self-generated
eviction notices on local and state authorities, claiming $100 million
in back rent.' They issued their own license plates, and counter-
19. See id. at 113-31 (describing Grey Lock's War, 1723-1724, in which the
charismatic Abenaki chief Grey Lock led raids against English settlements from Vermont
to central Massachusetts. The war finally died out, with several Abenaki tribes signing
peace treaties, though Grey Lock's Missisquoi never surrendered.).
20. Id. at 161-82; State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 20-21 (Vt. Dist.
Ct., Franklin Cir. Aug. 11, 1989).
21. CALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 204-23; St. Francis, slip op. at 27-28.
22. CALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 238.
23. Id. at 228-30; St. Francis, slip op. at 16.
24. St. Francis, slip op. at 16.
25. See New Chief Lends Militancy to Vermont Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1987, §
1, at 45 (noting that the lawyer who represented the Abenakis in their eight-year fishing
regulation battle regarded the election of Chief Homer St. Francis (the defendant for
whom the original court case is named) as a sign of "increased militancy" and an end to
the traditional Abenaki "low-key approach"). See also CALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 248-
51.
26. See Indians Confroht 20th Century Government, UPI, Oct. 19, 1987, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omii File (quoting Chief Homer St. Francis as saying, "[w]e're fed
up .... Our constitutional rights are being violated every day. The only way we can bring
this thing to a head is to go out and break the law.").
27. See Militant Elected Chief of Abenakis, UPI, Sept. 14, 1987, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File (quoting newly-elected Chief Homer St. Francis as saying, "Now I
break out my war belt, my medicine belt, my eagle feathers and sacred pipe and go to war
to get back the land white men stole from my people .... Tomorrow I'm going hunting.
Monday I clean house."); see also Anderson, supra note 14, at 20 (observing that St. Fran-
cis, a former Marine, had a long-running animosity with local and state police and that
his strategy for winning an Abenaki homeland included provoking state actions so that
the tribe could defend on sovereignty grounds in court).
28. Sally Johnson, Abenakis' Chief Pursues Cause Through Conflict, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1988, § 1, at 46.
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ticketed police who delivered traffic citations.29 This aggressive
strategy for securing a recognized Abenaki homeland stirred up
much publicity and some anxiety in Vermont throughout the 1980's,
while Indians and non-Indians alike awaited a judicial resolution of
the issue.30
The state dropped charges stemming from the first two fish-
ins,3 but it prosecuted thirty-six Abenakis in the third, and lost.3 2 In
1989, a state district court judge dismissed the case for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.33 In his comprehensive ninety-six-page
opinion, Judge Wolchik held that the Abenakis were not subject to
state fishing regulations on the Missisquoi because aboriginal title
to the area had never been extinguished.34 With this decision in
hand, the Abenaki chief hinted that the tribe might file a land claim
that would encompass one-third of all New England.3 5 In the 1992
decision of State v. Elliott, however, the Vermont Supreme Court re-
versed the district court, and found that Abenaki aboriginal title to
the area had long ago been extinguished by the "increasing weight of
history."3 6 Several months later the United States Supreme Court
declined to issue a writ of certiorari to hear the Abenakis' appeal,
thereby letting the decision stand."
11. ABOwRIGiNAL TrrLE DOCTRINE
A. Background
Upon the arrival of European colonists in North America, two
competing views of international law informed their desire for land
29. See id. (observing that when the Swanton police chief impounded Chief Homer
St. Francis' truck for bearing Abenaki Nation instead of Vermont plates, St. Francis
brought the matter before the Abenaki tribal court which fined the local police chief $500
for harassing St. Francis. As the tribal court is not recognized by anyone but the
Abenakis, the police chief refused to pay.).
30. See id. (observing that the chiefs combative tactics have cost him much support
among the Abenakis). See also Tribe Plans Another "Fish-in", UPI, Oct. 15, 1987, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
31. See New Chief, supra note 25, at 45 (noting that the prosecutor said he dropped
the charges both times because the complexity of the case required more legal attention
than he could provide).
32. State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr (Vt. Dist. Ct., Franklin Cir. Aug. 11,
1989).
33. Id.
34. Id., slip op. at 1.
35. See Judith Gaines, Tribe to Claim One-Third of New England, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 10, 1990, (Metro/Region Section) at 1 (stating that the Abenakis intended to bring a
federal land claim for "all of Vermont, all of New Hampshire, and parts of northern Mas-
sachusetts, western Maine, upstate New York and southern Quebec").
36. 616 A.2d 210, 218 (Vt. 1992).
37. 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993).
1994]
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occupied by American Indians. These views had been constructed
over centuries of European commercial and evangelical contact with
other parts of the world. The first was grounded in chauvinism and
racism: it saw the native inhabitants as subhuman heathens, unde-
serving of the bountiful lands they occupied. Under this paradigm,
Indian nations had no right to sovereignty and were automatically
subject to the conquering European power. 9 The second view rec-
ognized the sovereignty, if not the equality, of Indian nations. This
school held that Indians were entitled to their lands by natural law40
and the law of nations.4'
Francisco de Vitoria, an influential sixteenth-century Spanish
scholar, best exemplified this second school of thought. Vitoria re-
jected chauvinistic European title claims which were based on di-
vine right or superior civilization.42 He instead based his doctrines of
title succession on the principle of consent.43 According to Vitoria,
Europeans could not purchase or settle on Indian land without con-
sent of the owners.14 These principles of native sovereignty and
38. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail
of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Jurisprudence, 1986 WIs. L. REV. 219
(arguing that the European colonizing spirit was rooted in the medieval Catholic Church's
notions of unity and hierarchy which held that reason sprung only from the Catholic
Church and that all outside of it were infidels unworthy of recognition). See also Howard
R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United
States, 27 BuFF. L. REV. 637, 638-42 (1978) (discussing the arguments of John Quincy
Adams that Indian title could not be supported by the common law; and noting that in
Vattel's The Law of Nations, the proposition that the taking of Indian land by virtue of
cultural superiority was well supported).
39. Williams, supra note 38, at 254-58.
40. See Gordon I. Bennett, Aboriginal Title in the Common Law: A Stony Path
Through Feudal Doctrine, 27 BuFF. L. REV. 617, 619 (1978) (stating that in Roman law,
possessory title was deemed so fundamental as to be natural law, and that such title was
in itself proof of ownership and immune from challenge).
41. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 51-52 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN, HANDBOOK].
42. Id. at 50-52.
43. Id. at 53.
44. Id. at 51, 53. Vitoria argued not only that consent was required for transfer of
title from the Indians, but that the Indians, ignorant of the methods and designs of Euro-
peans, were ill-equipped to give it. Id. Vitoria insisted that any consent must be fully in-
formed and freely given:
Fear and ignorance, which vitiate every choice ought to be absent. But they
were markedly operative in the cases of choice and acceptance under considera-
tion, for the Indians did not know what they were doing; nay, they may not have
understood what the Spaniards were seeking. Further, we find the Spaniards
seeking it in armed array from an unwarlike and timid crowd. Seeing, then,
that in such cases of choice and acceptance as these there are not present all the
requisite elements of a valid choice, the title under review is utterly inadequate
and unlawful for seizing and retaining the provinces in question.
Id. at 51 n.10 (quoting Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de lure Belli Relectiones (J. Bate
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property rights were often reflected in the North American colonists'
attitudes and practices toward American Indians,45 and helped
shape early American Indian law.46
As Europeans purchased land from the original inhabitants,
there therefore remained the question of what property rights they
were buying. It was unclear whether the Indian tribes were selling
rights in fee simple absolute47 or only possessory interests. 48 Ques-
tions inevitably arose concerning the validity of the whites' pur-
chases and the rights of Indians to alienate their property. The doc-
trine of aboriginal title, drawing on both Vitoria's consent theory
and centuries-old European chauvinism, was created to solve these
problems.49
B. Introduction of Aboriginal Title Doctrine
The doctrine of aboriginal title was elaborated in a string of
cases decided by the Marshall-era Supreme Court.5" With virtually
no constitutional guidance in the area,"' the Court strove to create a
method of determining the scope of Indian property rights and sov-
ereignty. Perhaps more importantly, however, the Court needed to
trans.) Carnegie Institution 1917 (1557)).
Of course, this principle was not reflected in reality during the conquest of America.
Conquistadors often enslaved Indians and appropriated their land. Id. at 52. But those
conquerors were operating outside of the law. The policy as set by the king and the Pope
clearly delineated native rights. Id. Sadly, the conquistadors, by virtue of geographic dis-
tance, were a law unto themselves. Id.
45. Id. at 53-62. "The English, like the Spanish and Dutch, uniformly acknowledged
Indian title to lands actually occupied or improved by the Indians." Id. at 54-55 (citations
omitted).
46. Id. at 52.
47. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 615 (6th ed. 1990) (defining fee simple absolute as
an estate in property to which the owner is entitled without limitation and with uncondi-
tional power to dispose of it as he or she chooses).
48. See id. at 1165 (analogizing this interest to the right of a tenant for years, or one
which gives the possessor a certain degree of physical control over the land including the
right to exclude others from any present occupation of the land).
49. Without any change in definition, this doctrine has been called by several
names: "Indian title," "original Indian title," "native title," and "aboriginal title." For
simplicity's sake and in keeping with the modem trend, this Article will use the term
"aboriginal title," except where otherwise required by textual reference.
50. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. MIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power To... regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." Id. Except for the commerce clause reference to "Indian Tribes," the only mention
of American Indians in the United States Constitution is the provision that "Indians not
taxed" are not to be counted when tallying state populations for the purpose of apportion-
ing representatives in Congress. Id. at art. I, § 2, cl. 3; amend. XIV, § 2.
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articulate a principle for title succession in a young country which
was acquiring real estate at a staggering rate. 2
In 1810, the Marshall Court first faced the issue of Indian
property rights in Fletcher v. Peck .5 Fletcher did not involve Indian
interests directly; rather, the case concerned the property rights of
whites to whom Indian land had been conveyed. Particularly, the
Court questioned whether the state of Georgia could legitimately
convey to a speculator lands possessed by Indians.54 The majority in
Fletcher held that the state did have the power to convey that which
it did not own entirely. Chief Justice Marshall asserted that "Indian
title" vested possessory rights in the native inhabitants while simul-
taneously leaving ultimate ownership in the state.55 Without elabo-
ration, the Chief Justice thus split the property rights between Indi-
ans and the dominant sovereign,5" leaving Georgia with paramount
title, including the right to convey Indian land. At the same time,
Chief Justice Marshall introduced the concept of "Indian title" into
American jurisprudence, acknowledging the existence of American
Indian possessory interests in their ancestral lands. 8 The decision
also held that, within its territory, the United States was the only
sovereign entity with the power to extinguish Indian title.5 9
While the Fletcher Court did a remarkable job of accommodat-
ing the various interests involved, it posed more questions than it
answered regarding Indian law. The decision did not explain what
legal or equitable rights aboriginal title left in the Indian inhabi-
52. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34 (1947)
[hereinafter Cohen, Original Indian Title] (noting that the United States bought more
than two million square miles of territory from American Indians over a period of 150
years).
53. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
54. See Jill Norgren, Protection of What Rights They Have: Original Principles of
Federal Indian Law, 64 N.D. L. REV. 73, 83-87 (1988) (describing the Fletcher case as a
"squabble among thieves," relating to "aggressive, and fraudulent, speculative schemes in
western [American Indian] land claimed by the state of Georgia"). While the land was oc-
cupied by Georgia tribes, the state had sold the lands to a private company and the land
subsequently changed hands resulting in a conveyance from Peck to Fletcher. Id.
55. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142-43.
56. See Berman, supra note 40, at 642 (noting that in the context of the entire opin-
ion, the concept that split the property rights between the state government and the Indi-
ans in possession seems to have sprung full-blown from a single sentence). The concept of
split title has been called "a mere naked declaration, without any discussion or reasoning
by the court in support of it." Id. (quoting 3 JAMES KENT, COMIIMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 379 n.(c) (Philadelphia, Blackstone New York 1889) (1826)).
It appears, however, that the "declaration" was steeped in the discovery doctrine. Id.
at 642. While it had not been explicitly introduced into U.S. common law, the discovery
doctrine was a well-established principle of international law. Id.
57. Id. at 641.
58. Norgren, supra note 54, at 84.
59. Berman, supra note 38, at 641.
[Vol. 42
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tants,6 0 nor did it explain what constituted legitimate extinguish-
ment of those rights by the sovereign. A more thorough articulation
of the concept was left for Chief Justice Marshall's 1823 opinion in
Johnson v. M'Intosh.6'
C. The Discovery Doctrine and Extinguishment
Johnson is the pivotal case defining native property rights and
the power of the United States to delimit those rights. In Johnson,
the Piankeshaw and Illinois Indian nations had granted land to pri-
vate persons before the American Revolution.62 After the war, these
same nations ceded the same land again through treaty to the
United States, which in turn granted a portion of the land to one
M'Intosh.63 MIntosh then sued to eject the devisees of the original
pre-war grantee. The question before the Court was whether private
purchasers of tribal land could enforce their title against a later
grant by the same tribe to the federal government. Chief Justice
Marshall narrowly framed the question: "The inquiry ... is, in a
great measure, confined to the power of Indians to give, and of pri-
vate individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the
courts of this Country."'
The Court based its holding on the doctrine of discovery, which
purported to regulate the European right to land acquisition in the
60. The uncertainty on this point is illustrated by Justice Johnson's dissent. He
asked:
Can, then, one nation be said to be seized of a fee-simple in lands, the right of
soil of which is in another nation? It is awkward to apply the technical idea of a
fee-simple to the interests of a nation, but I must consider an absolute right of
soil as an interest to them and their heirs.... In fact, if the Indian nations be
the absolute proprietors of their soil, no other nation can be said to have the
same interest in it.
Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 147 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
In Johnson's view, Georgia did not have a fee simple, but only "a power to acquire a
fee-simple by purchase, when the proprietors should be pleased to sell." Id.
61. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
62. Id. See also Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 52, at 47 (noting that John-
son, like Fletcher, did not involve a live issue of Indian claims). The land at issue had not
been inhabited by Indians for at least 50 years. Id. After the grants to the original vend-
ees in 1753 and 1755, for which the vendors had received $55,000.00, the Indian owners
moved from the area. Id.
63. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 543.
64. Id. at 572. See Berman, supra note 38, at 654 (stating that Johnson was not only
critical to the development of aboriginal title, but also to the related concept of sover-
eignty). By asking whether a private dispute over title to Indian lands "can be sustained
in the courts of this country," Chief Justice Marshall indicated the absolutely sovereign
nature of tribes. Id. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction over such a claim
where a foreign sovereign had granted the land. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
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Americas.6 5 According to this doctrine, "discovery" of lands by Euro-
pean adventurers bestowed paramount title on the nation of those
adventurers.6 This title, however, was not "consummated" until the
lands were actually possessed by the discovering nation. If the
lands were already possessed by natives, then the discovering nation
gained only the exclusive right to acquire possession from the na-
tives and to settle it.6
As articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, the discovery doctrine
gave the discovering nation, or its sovereign successor, the exclusive
right to purchase Indian land. In modern terms, the discovery doc-
trine might be equated with the political "sphere of influence" con-
cept.69 It was a distributional principle for territorial claims among
competing European powers.7 The only immediate effect of its ex-
ercise on the territory's native inhabitants was that it prevented
them from alienating their lands to any but the discovering sover-
eign or its successor.7'
The doctrine did not mean, however, that Indian property
rights were extinguished upon discovery. Johnson held that Indians
remained "the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it." 72 As in Fletcher v. Peck, the title
was split.73 The discovering sovereign and its successors had
"ultimate dominion," while the concurrent possessory interests of
the original inhabitants continued to be recognized. 4 The discoverer
had the sole power to extinguish aboriginal title, and could exercise
that right "by purchase or by conquest.""




69. See MARK F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (1926). The sphere of influence concept holds that
global powers indirectly control geographical areas and the governments therein may not
safely contravene the important interests of the controlling dominant global power for
that area. Id.
70. Norgren, supra note 54, at 91-93.
71. See Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 52, at 35 (noting that the case of
the Louisiana Purchase is the classic example of how the discovery doctrine affected the
respective rights of the discoverer and the Indian tribes). France claimed paramount title
to the Louisiana Territory as a result of discovery and exploration. Id. When the United
States bought that title from France in 1803, it actually acquired only the right to re-pur-
chase the land from the Indian inhabitants. Id. at 34-35. While the United States paid
Napoleon 15 million dollars for his title, it subsequently paid the western Indians twenty
times that amount for the same land. Id.
72. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
73. See discussion supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
74. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
75. Id. at 587. The unfortunate references in Johnson to extinguishment by con-
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While the discovering sovereign, as holder of the "exclusive ti-
tle,"76 could grant its interests in Indian lands to third parties, such
grants could not extinguish the interests of the Indians. The Court
held that the Indian right of occupancy by virtue of aboriginal title
always encumbered these grants.77 Thus, fee simple absolute could
not vest in the grantee until the sovereign extinguished aboriginal
title. Once it did so, the sovereign consummated its "absolute title"
and the Indians lost all possessory rights.78
Under these principles, the deed which the plaintiff, the origi-
nal grantee in Johnson, took from the Indians was not recognizable
in a United States court.79 The Court dismissed the plaintiffs claim
on the grounds that it could not adjudicate the validity of a grant
made by other sovereigns, in this case the Piankeshaw and Illinois
nations. 0 The Court could, however, adjudicate the status of the
quest have served as the foundation for later "judicial diminution of native rights." Ber-
man, supra note 38, at 644. In reality, however, these references amount to little more
than puffery.
First, they are dicta, since the lands in question in the case had either been sold to
private individuals or ceded by treaty to the United States. No one claimed to have con-
quered them. Id.
Second, they are historically inaccurate, since purchase of Indian land was far more
common as a method of extinguishment than was conquest. Id. at 648 (citing Cohen,
Original Indian Title, supra note 52, at 34-35, 45-46.)
Finally, they are misleading, since Marshall uses "conquest" as a virtual synonym for
mere discovery. As one commentator has noted,
Virtually every expression of "conquest," "sovereignty," or "ultimate dominion"
is followed in the opinion by either a declaration of the exclusive right of the
United States to extinguish the Indian title, or a repetition of the limitation of
the right of alienation of Indian lands. The theory of conquest under discovery,
then, created no greater rights than the doctrine of discovery as it was initially
articulated.
Id. at 649.
The "conquest" dicta may have been nothing more than "a conceit, a metaphor of
European superiority," included to appease "anti-tribal opinion in the United States."
Norgren, supra note 54, at 92. They may also have been meant to prevent invalidation of
title in states which had acquired some Indian land through no other means than vio-
lence. Id. at 92 n.108.
At any rate, later cases have qualified the "conquest" dicta to such an extent as to
render them practically meaningless. See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
76. Johnson, 21 US. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 588.
79. Id. at 593.
80. Id.
"The grant [to the plaintiff] derives its efficacy from [the Indian nationsl will;
and if they choose to resume it, and make a different disposition of the land, the
Courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. The
person who purchases land from the Indians, within their territory... holds
their title under their protection, and subject to their laws."
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later grant stemming from the Indian cession to the United States.
That cession extinguished the aboriginal occupancy rights, clearing
the title for the United States' grantee, who prevailed in the litiga-
tion.8'
Johnson v. M'Intosh has been variously described as a 'brilliant
compromise" 2 and "one of the most misunderstood cases in the An-
glo-American law."3 These characterizations are not mutually ex-
clusive. They do indicate, however, that Johnson should be read
with an exacting eye. The ponderous dicta provide ample opportu-
nity for latter-day jurists to pick and choose passages that would
satisfy an unduly restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of abo-
riginal title.84 Nevertheless, one thing is sure about the Johnson
holding: it recognized Indian tribes' legal right to possession of their
lands until such right is extinguished by the United States through
purchase or conquest.' While Johnson's introduction of "conquest"
into the extinguishment formula invites speculation that the process
may be non-consensual, this conclusion is far from clear.86
D. The Requirement of Indian Consent
1. Indian Consent in the Marshall Era. After the discussion of
aboriginal title in Johnson v. M'Intosh, serious questions remained
about its scope and the appropriate methods of extinguishment. In
the two "Cherokee cases,""7 the Marshall Court went to great lengths
to stress the need for Indian consent to extinguishment, while tern-
81. Id. at 593-94.
82. See Nell J. Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1223 (1980) (pointing out that Johnson skillfully reconciled the
countervailing land rights of the Indians and the United States). Professor Newton illus-
trates the point by describing the other options open to Chief Justice Marshall at the
time:
On one hand, he could have relied on the traditional legal maxim, nemo dat
quod non habet (no one gives what he does not have), to conclude that because
the Indian tribes had no cognizable right to their lands, the original sale was
void. On the other hand, if he concluded the Indians' rights to their land were
absolute, as Justice Johnson had suggested in Fletcher, he would invalidate the
government grants of land occupied by Indian tribes, which formed the basis of
most claims to real property in this country.
Id. (citing Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 52, at 48-49).
83. Berman, supra note 38, at 655; COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 41, at 488.
84. Berman, supra note 38, at 655-56.
85. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587-88.
86. See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text. But see also Berman, supra note
38, at 655-56. "[Johnson] did, however, establish a language of juridical discourse that
would potentially rationalize the process of'manifest destiny' and provide the conceptual
space for the forced extinguishment of Indian lands." Id.
87. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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pering the earlier references to conquest as a legitimate method of
termination.
The Cherokee cases represented a struggle between the State of
Georgia and the Cherokee Nation, which was located within the
State's exterior boundaries." Amid a national schism over federal
removal of the southeastern tribes to reservations across the Mis-
sissippi, 9 Georgia had been steadily attempting to "annihilate the
Cherokees as a political society"90 through state legislation.91 In
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,2 the plaintiff sought to enjoin these
laws on the grounds that it was a nation apart from the United
States and not subject to regulation.93 Chief Justice Marshall dis-
missed the case for jurisdictional insufficiency. The Cherokees, ac-
cording to the Court, were not a "foreign nation" within the meaning
of Article III of the Constitution, and therefore could not invoke the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.9 4
Cherokee Nation is important not only for its dicta wrestling
with the relationship between Indian nations and the United
States,95 but also for its affirmation of the Indian consent require-
ment for extinguishment of aboriginal title: "[Tihe Indians are ac-
knowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore unquestioned
right to the lands they occupy, until that right be extinguished by a
voluntary cession to our government .... 6
In the second Cherokee case, Worcester v. Georgia,97 Chief Jus-
88. By the time of this controversy, the Cherokee Nation had established a stable
and centralized polity. They had adopted many of the trappings of "civilization" which
characterized the neighboring white society, including a system of laws and a constitution
modelled on that of the United States. See Norgren, supra note 54, at 95. See also Chero-
kee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 6.
89. See Norgren, supra note 54, at 96, 97.
90. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
91. ROBERT N. CLINTON, ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW (3d ed. 1991). In 1828,
Georgia passed legislation declaring all Cherokee laws, ordinances, and regulations null
and void. Id. at 13. Georgia also passed a law requiring white people within Cherokee
territory to acquire a state license and a law rendering Cherokees incompetent to testify
at trials in which a white person was a party. Id. The Cherokees fought back through liti-
gation.
92. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
93. Id. at 2-3.
94. Id. at 20.
95. The Chief Justice noted that the relationship between tribes and the United
States was "perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence." Id. at 16. He then
characterized Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations," within the United States.
Id. at 17. "Their relation to the United States," he said, "resembles that of a ward to his
guardian." Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). The expansive holding of Worcester that state law
"can have no force" in Indian Country, id. at 561, has been limited several times over the
years. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1961) and cases cited; New
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tice Marshall dispelled any remaining misconceptions about aborig-
inal title. He reiterated the discovery doctrine as articulated in
Johnson, but explicitly stated that European discovery rights could
have no effect on Indian possessory rights."' No grant by the sover-
eign of lands encumbered by aboriginal title could extinguish that
title.99
More importantly, the Worcester Court repudiated the conquest
theory put forward in Johnson, together with its intimation of non-
consensual extinguishment. The Court described the notion that
discovery is tantamount to conquest as "extravagant and absurd. " '
Chief Justice Marshall ridiculed the idea that discovery was a device
by which one sovereign people forced its will on another. 10' Neither
was conquest by war to be considered a legitimate mode of extin-
guishment.'2 Extinguishment, he stated, is the act of the sovereign
acquiring "such lands as the natives [are] willing to sell,""3 and thus
vesting all rights in itself. When a tribe agrees to sell its land to the
sovereign, it consents to have its aboriginal title extinguished. De-
spite an anomalous reference to conquest,1 4 it was clear from the
decision that no method other than voluntary cession by the Indians
would extinguish aboriginal title.105
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1983) and cases cited. These
limitations, however, do not bear on the issue of extinguishment of aboriginal title, on
which point Worcester remains good law.
98. Id. at 544. "[Discovery doctrine] regulated the right given by discovery among
the European discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in possession,
either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the
memory of man." Id. Cf Johnson v. MIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (noting
that discovery necessarily impaired the property interests of Indians).
99. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 546.
100. Id. at 544-45. "The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements
made on the sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legiti-
mate power by [their charters] to govern the [Indian] people, or occupy the lands from sea
to sea, did not enter the mind of any man." Id.
101.
It is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either quar-
ter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabi-
tants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that discovery of either by
the other should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which an-
nulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors.
Id. at 543.
102. Id. at 545. "The power of war is given only for defence, not for conquest." Id.
103. Id.
104. "But power, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by
the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend." Id. at
543.
105. In the sentence following the conquest reference, the Chief Justice states, "[wie
proceed then to the actual state of things, having glanced at their origin; because holding
it in our recollection may shed some light on existing pretensions." Id. That "actual state
of things," in Chief Justice Marshall's view, was heavily in the favor of the Indians. In a
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The Court further clarified the requirement of Indian consent
to extinguish in Mitchel v. United States,05 the final Marshall Court
decision on aboriginal title. In Mitchel, the Court held that an In-
dian nation could transfer its title to a private party with the con-
sent of the sovereign.'01 This decision necessitated a discussion of
the scope of aboriginal title. Writing for the majority, Justice Bald-
win characterized the Indian right of occupancy as "perpetual"
08
and as "sacred as the fee simple of the whites."0 9 He reiterated the
discovery doctrine with particular emphasis on the sovereign's in-
ability to impair Indian possessory rights except through purchase,
cession, or abandonment."0 Justice Baldwin stated flatly, "posses-
sion could not be taken without [Indian] consent.""'
Tribal consent was a necessary element to the extinguishment
of aboriginal title as enunciated by the Marshall Court. Indian pos-
sessory rights to their ancestral land could not be extinguished
review of English settlement in North America, he notes that the Crown granted its-
royally chartered companies only that title which the Crown could claim. This consisted
of the "exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell." Id. at
545. He later notes that "[tihe king puchased their lands when they were willing to sell,
at a price they were willing to take; but never coerced a surrender of them." Id. at 547.
This consensual, treaty-based arrangement "was the settled state of things when the war
of our revolution commenced." Id. at 549. Chief Justice Marshall concludes this review by
stating that even the acts of Georgia tended to "prove her acquiescence in the universal
conviction that the Indian nations possessed a full right to the lands they occupied, until
that right should be extinguished by the United States, with their consent...." Id. at
560.
Tellingly, the Chief Justice does not revisit or explain the seemingly flip reference to
conquest. Like the similar reference in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587
(1823), it may be aptly described as nothing more than "a conceit, a metaphor for Euro-
pean superiority." Norgren, supra note 54 at 92 (referring to the conquest dictum in
Johnson). See also Berman, supra note 38, at 660-65 (analyzing Worcester's repudiation of
the conquest notion as a legitimate mode of extinguishment).
For a discussion of the conquest dicta in Johnson, see supra note 75.
106. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
107. Id. at 732. Spain was the sovereign of Florida at the time of the transaction. Id.
at 724. The United States subsequently patented the land after Spain ceded Florida. Id. A
claimant holding title traceable to the United States patent sued to clear the title. The
Court decided that Spain had taken no formal procedures to extinguish the land under
the discovery doctrine. Id. at 753-56. Spain confirmed the transaction and thus allowed
the grantee to take fee simple title. The Court held that this title was superior to that
which the United States asserted because Spain's act of cession ratified all of Spain's
prior grants in Florida. Id. at 734-35.
108. Id. at 746.
109. Id. (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 48 (1831) (Baldwin,
J., concurring)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 745-46. 'Subject to this right of possession, the ultimate fee was in the
crown and its grantees, which could be granted by the crown or colonial legislatures while
the lands remained in the possession of the Indians, though possession could not be taken
without their consent." Id.
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without it." The Worcester and Mitchel decisions laid to rest the
earlier ambiguous references in Johnson to conquest as a viable ex-
tinguishment method. 1 3 Nevertheless, later courts which restricted
aboriginal title preferred to rely on Johnson,1' 4 whose ambiguous
conquest dicta supplied the conceptual space for nonconsensual ex-
tinguishment of aboriginal title.'15
2. The Modern Era: The Indian Consent Requirement Reaf-
firmed. From Mitchel through the mid-twentieth century, the Court
never abandoned the basic principles of aboriginal title doctrine.1 6
In the 1940s and 1950s, however, the Court's attitude toward the
doctrine moved from cautious 117 to overtly hostile, 118 even while con-
tinuing to rely on the Marshall Court decisions as the doctrinal
genesis of federal Indian law. This apparent withdrawal of support
for Indian land rights may be explained by the politics of the times.
By the late 1930s, the United States government had begun the era
of "termination," in which it attempted to abandon its trust relation-
ship toward the tribes."' The policy of this twenty-year period was
characterized by particularly virulent assaults on Indian property
and sovereignty.1 0 The aboriginal title cases from this era indicate
that the Court did not escape the fallout of the termination policy.
The United States Supreme Court's first significant mid-cen-
tury pronouncement on aboriginal title came in United States ex rel.
Hualpai v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad (Walapai Tribe).'2' Following
the peculiar Marshall Court formula, Justice Douglas began his
112. Voluntary abandonment was the sole exception to this rule. Id. at 745.
113. Berman, supra note 38, at 660, 666; Norgren, supra note 54, at 106-12.
114. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (stating
that Indian possessory rights are derogable "at will" by the United States); United States
v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) (stating that the native tribes had never been
regarded as owners of the land they occupied).
115. Berman, supra note 38, at 555-56.
116. Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 52, at 47.
117. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hualpai v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339
(1941); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946). See discussion in-
fra notes 121-140 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). See dis-
cussion infra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
119. See COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 41, at 152-80 (detailing the legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial policies of the termination era).
120. Id. at 153. This era has been described as "the most concerted drive against
Indian property and Indian survival since the removals following the acts of 1830 and the
liquidation of tribes and reservations following 1887." Id. (quoting ANGIE DEBO, A
HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 349 (1970)).
121. 314 U.S. 339 (1941). Although "Hualpai" appears in the title of the action, the
alternate spelling "Walapai" is used throughout the text of the opinion. This Article will
follow the practice of recent commentators, and use the short form "Walapai Tribe."
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opinion with a recitation of the sovereign's power to extinguish. He
stated that "whether [extinguishment] be done by treaty, by the
sword, by purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion adverse to
the right of occupancy, or otherwise, its justness is not open to, in-
quiry in the courts."1" The Vermont court used this statement in
support of its holding in Elliott." However, the statement was ex-
traneous dicta, since the Waapai Tribe Court concluded that none of
the methods listed had in fact succeeded in extinguishing the Wala-
pais' aboriginal title.' Furthermore, it was to a great degree un-
supported by precedent."
The Walapai Tribe Court was on much firmer ground in its re-
affirmation of the principles of consensual extinguishment.2 6 In its
factual analysis, the Court considered a series of unilateral actions
taken by the United States government in an effort to dispossess the
Walapai tribe.'27 The most drastic of these events was the govern-
ment's forcible removal of the Walapais to a reservation in 1874.28
122. Id. at 347.
123. State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 213 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993).
124. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
Justice Douglas cites Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U.S. 55, 66 (1886), and
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877), to support his dicta. However, the relevant
language in those cases is dicta as well. In both cases, as in Walapai Tribe itself, the
actual extinguishment was accomplished with Indian consent. See Buttz, 119 U.S. at 69
("The Indians on the different reservations accepted the condition and ratified the agree-
ment as modified. . . ."); Beecher, 95 U.S. at 526 ("Tlhe Menomonees [sic], by treaty,
ceded to the United States all their lands in Wisconsin... ")
125. Joseph W. Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American
Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 12-17, on file with
author and with the Buffalo Law Review). Singer demonstrates that the Buttz and Wala-
pai Tribe Courts misconstrued the meaning of Beecher. Beecher held that it was the
granting of the fee by the United States, and not the method of extinguishment, which
was a nonjusticiable act. Id. at 14 (citing Beecher, 95 U.S. at 525).
126. Instead of simply relying on the consensual extinguishment principles of the
aboriginal title doctrine, the Court relied on the Act of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 292, which
provided that extinguishment of Indian title to the particular lands in question could take
place "only by their voluntary cession." Id., quoted in Walapai Tribe, 314 U.S. at 344.
That language from the Act, however, is a descendant of similar language found in
policy statements stretching back to Britain's colonial period and reaffirmed continously
by the United States Congress in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the Nonintercourse
Acts, and numerous acts of admission of states. Also, the Marshall Court decided in the
absence of any statutory mandate that voluntary cession was required. See supra section
II.D.1. The appearance of consensual extinguishment language in the Act of 1866 reflects
a standard that had never been abandoned.
127. The Court considered several actions by the sovereign that, according to the re-
spondent, demonstrated extinguishment. These included: forcible removal of the Walapai
from their homeland by order of the Indian Department, Walapai Tribe, 319 U.S. at 354-
56; nonconsensual creation of a reservation to accommodate removal, id. at 351-54; and
an act of Congress to survey Walapai lands, id. at 348-51.
128. See id. at 355 (admonishing that "[ilt was a high-handed endeavor [on the part
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The Court found that since the Walapais did not show any "plain
intent" to quit their aboriginal lands in exchange for a reservation,
their title to the lands had not been extinguished. 129 In scrutinizing
congressional intent to extinguish, the Court found that Congress's
creation of this reservation was only an "offer" to the Walapais, and
did not rise to the level of extinguishment. 3 Without the agreement
of the Walapais to cede their lands, aboriginal title remained intact.
The Court finally determined that only the act of creating a Walapai
reservation at the insistence of the tribe was sufficient to extinguish
the Walapais' rights to their aboriginal lands outside the reserva-
tion. 13 1
Walapai Tribe's endorsement of Indian consent for extinguish-
ment was reaffirmed by the Court just five years later in United
States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks."3 ' Tillamooks presented the
novel question of whether a tribe could recover for aboriginal title
taken pursuant to executive order.1 13 A sharply divided Court found
that it could. 34 Whether the Court based this holding on the Fifth
Amendment is debatable." 5 Nevertheless, the Court felt compelled
of the Indian Department] to wrest from these Indians lands which Congress had never
declared forfeited").
129. Id. at 354.
130. Id. at 353.
131. See id. at 357-58. The Court held that aboriginal title was only extinguished af-
ter the Walapai petitioned the government for the creation of a reservation and Congress
complied. Id. at 358. It is interesting to consider the background for this petition. In 1881,
several years after the Walapais' forced removal from, and subsequent return to, their
ancestral lands, they allegedly presented a United States Army officer with their reasons
for desiring a reservation. Id. at 356. According to the officer's statement, white settle-
ment had driven the Walapais from all water sources in their traditional area. Id. There-
fore, the tribe urged the creation of a reservation "while there is still time" where "the
land can never be of any great use to the Whites; that there are no mineral deposits upon
it, as it has been thoroughly prospected; that there is little or no arable land; that the
water is in such small quantities, and the country is so rocky and void of grass, that it
would not be available for stock raising." Id. at 356-57. After careful consideration, the
United States agreed to provide such a reservation, and the Walapais, by accepting it,
implicitly gave up their other lands. Id. at 357-58.
132. 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
133. Id. at 44.
134. A four-justice plurality, led by Chief Justice Vinson, decided that compensation
was required. Id. at 41. Justice Black concurred, id. at 54, and Justice Reed wrote for a
three-justice dissent. Id. at 55. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion. Id. at 54.
135. Newton, supra note 82, at 1230. As a result of the decision, the Court of Claims
awarded the Tillamooks $3,000,000 for the land taken with an additional $14,000,000 of
interest from the date of the taking. Id. at 1231. Since the interest payment would be re-
quired only if the Fifth Amendment were implicated, the United States appealed the
award, claiming that the case had been decided on a jurisdictional act, not on the Fifth
Amendment. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 (1951) (per curiam)
(Tillamooks I).
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to extensively review the unbroken chain of cases relying on Indian
consent before reaching its holding.
In the familiar Marshall Court formula, the Tillamooks Court
initially signalled the paramount power of the sovereign to extin-
guish Indian title."3 6 But Chief Justice Vinson followed this with a
solid litany of case law... and policy138 showing the requirement of
Indian consent for extinguishment. "In our opinion," he concluded,
"taking original Indian title without compensation and without con-
sent does not satisfy the 'high standards for fair dealing' required of
the United States in controlling Indian affairs."139 Although the con-
sent reference was not central to the holding in Tillamooks, its ex-
aggerated presence there underscores its importance to the Court.
Although Tillamooks appeared to secure aboriginal title as a
compensable property right, 4 the termination-era Court had not yet
had the last word on the subject. Nine years after Tillamooks, the
The Court expressly found that the Fifth Amendment had not been implicated, id. at
49, and thereby saved the government $14,000,000. For a discussion of the case, see New-
ton, supra note 82, at 1231-32.
136. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. at 46. ("Nor could the Indians themselves prevent a tak-
ing of tribal lands or forestall a termination of their title.") Like Chief Justice Marshall
referring to "conquest" in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823), and
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832), Chief Justice Vinson gives no
authority for this assertion of Indian impotence regarding their lands.
137. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. at 47. The Court primarily invoked the Indian consent
language from Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543, 544, 547, but also cited United States ex rel.
Hualpai v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 356 (1941) (Walapai Tribe).
138. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. at 47-49. The Court stated that "[i]t was usual policy not
to coerce the surrender of lands without consent and without compensation." Id. at 48.
The Court supported this claim with a quote from a Marshall-era opinion by Attorney
General William Wirt: "The practical admission of the European conquerors of this coun-
try renders it unnecessary for us to speculate on the extent of that right which they might
have asserted from conquest .... The conquerors have never claimed more than the ex-
clusive right of purchase from the Indians ... ." Id. at 48 n.19 (quoting 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
465, 466 (1821)) (omissions in original). William Wirt, incidentally, was the man who ar-
gued the Cherokees' case before the Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1(1831).
The Court also cites the Northwest Ordinance, which stated that Indians' "'land and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent....'" Tillamooks, 329
U.S. at 48 (quoting Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789)) (omission in original).
139. Id. at 47 (quoting Walapai Tribe, 314 U.S.'at 356.)
140. Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 52, at 57-59. Writing in 1947, Profes-
sor Cohen optimistically stated that Tillamooks had buried the "'menagerie' theory of In-
dian title." Id. at 57-58. That theory was based on the assumption that American Indians
were less than human and that their relationship to the land was akin to to that of the
animals which wandered over it. Id. at 58. Under this theory, the government need not
compensate American Indians for the loss of their land as it would Europeans. Eight
years after Professor Cohen wrote this, however, the Supreme Court recanted, and held
that the government was not compelled to compensate American Indians for the loss of
their aboriginal title. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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Court took a decidedly hostile approach to Indian land rights in Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.' Writing for the Tee-Hit-Ton
Court, Justice Reed found that the United States was not compelled
to compensate American Indian tribes for extinguished aboriginal
title. Making a remarkable distinction between "recognized" title
and aboriginal title, 2 the Court held that only the former was com-
pensable. 43 Tee-Hit-Ton's holding was limited to compensation and
does not bear on the legality of extinguishment, but its analysis of
the nature of aboriginal title threatens the viability of the requir-
ment of Indian consent.
As does every Court considering aboriginal title, the Tee-Hit-
Ton Court relied on the Marshall Court for an explication of the dis-
covery doctrine. Justice Reed radically departed from this precedent,
however, by equating discovery with conquest. He appeared to con-
tend that the very presence of whites in North America had effected
a conquest over all the continent's indigenous peoples. 144 This in-
cluded the Tee-Hit-Ton Tlingits of Alaska, who had never raised
arms against the United States or its predecessor, Russia.'45 Follow-
ing this "conquest," according to Justice Reed, the discoverers then
gave the Indians permission to occupy certain lands at the discov-
erers' sufferance. 46 Where this permission exists without express
congressional recognition it is aboriginal, as opposed to recognized,
title, according to Tee-Hit-Ton.
Although Justice Reed purported to derive these principles
from Johnson v. M'Intosh,47 that seminal case and its progeny frame
the discovery doctrine in starkly different terms. 4 Aboriginal title is
141. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
142. Id. at 279 ("[Aboriginal title] means mere possession not specifically recognized
as ownership by Congress."). See Newton, supra note 82, at 1216, 1217 (arguing that Jus-
tice Reed's legal precedent was "questionable" and that his analysis of that precedent was
"unsound"). See also Singer, supra note 125, manuscript at 30 (calling the conclusions
reached in the Tee-Hit-Ton decision "extraordinary [and] outrageous").
143. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 277-78 (Where title is recognized, "compensation must
be paid for subsequent taking."); Id. at 288-89 (Unrecognized aboriginal title "may be ex-
tinguished by the Government without compensation.").
144. Id. at 279 (using the phrase "after the coming of the white man" synonymously
with "after conquest?; noting that "discovery and conquest gave the conquerors sover-
eignty"). But see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544-45 (1832) (describing it as
"extravagant and absurd" to equate discovery with conquest). See discussion of Worcester,
supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
145. See Newton, supra note 82, at 1244.
146. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 279.
147. Id. at 284-85 (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)).
148. See, eg., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Justice Reed studi-
ously avoided reference to Worcester, citing it only once, and then in seeming support of
the proposition that Congress may, when it chooses, pass "compassionate" legislation "to
extinguish Indian title through negotiation rather than by force." Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S.
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not a gift from the sovereign; its legitimacy does not flow from the
Crown or its successors.' Rather, it is a communal title which
springs, from the ancient sovereignty of the. indigenous tribes.150 It
exists in a realm parallel to European tenures, but is never impaired
by them.151 The sovereign may extinguish the title, but only through
the proper legislative process.- Justice Reed's notion that .discovery
was a magical moment which instantly nullified native land rights
is contrary to Johnson v. M'Intosh,'52 and has been implicitly re-
jected by the Supreme Court in its most recent pronouncements on
the issue. 1 3
Tee-Hit-Ton appears to do tremendous violence to the concept of
aboriginal title. Nevertheless, several considerations militate toward
a limited impact of the case. First, its actual holding is relatively
narrow. The rule of Tee-Hit-Ton is simply that aboriginal title, with-
out formal government recognition, is not compensable under the
Fifth Amendment. It is not concerned with acceptable methods of
extinguishment. The Tee-Hit-Tons were claiming compensation, not
challenging whether, or how, their land had been extinguished. Sec-
ond, it can be argued that Tee-Hit-Ton was an historical enigma.
The Tee-Hit-Ton Court's views on Indians were a product of the by-
gone termination era, views which are no longer politically legiti-
mate. The Court's use of ethnicity or race to weigh property interests
is repugnant to contemporary notions of racial dignity. 154 It is a
damning but accurate commentary on Tee-Hit-Ton that American
Indian rights are better protected by the decisions of the slavery-era
Marshall Court than by that of a Court which, one year previously,
had struck down racial segregation in public schools in Brown v.
Board of Education."5
at 273-74 & n.2.
In fact, Worcester held that Indian land rights were based not on the largesse of the
discoverer, as Justice Reed would have it, but on the Indians' pre-existing rights "as abo-
riginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of
man." Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544.
149. See Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 492 (1967) ("Indian
title based on aboriginal possession does not depend upon sovereign recognition or af-
firmative acceptance for its survival.").
150. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544.
151. Id. at 546. The royal charters of colonial companies, having only the title which
the Crown could claim, "asserted a title against Europeans only, and were considered as
blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were concerned." Id.
152. See Johnson v. MIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574. The Chief Justice recog-
nized the Indians as "the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal, as well as just claim
to retain possession of it." Id (emphasis added).
153. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
154. See Newton, supra note 82, at 1249-53 (considering the ethnocentric opinions
that helped frame Tee-Hit-Ton).
155. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Finally, it appears that the Supreme Court has reconsidered
the Tee-Hit-Ton analysis and found it lacking. In more recent cases
requiring explication of the doctrine of aboriginal title, the Court has
avoided reference to Tee-11it-Ton in favor of the earlier but better-
reasoned Walapai Tribe decision. In the 1974 decision of Oneida
Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (Oneida I),' the Court declined
to distinguish between recognized and unrecognized title, instead
quoting Walapai Tribe to the effect that "a tribal right of occupancy,
to be protected, need not be 'based upon a treaty, statute, or other
formal government action "157 The Court also cited, in a block quote,
language from Worcester requiring Indian consent for proper extin-
guishment, 58 and it quoted with approval the famous passage from
Mitchel that the "Indian 'right of occupancy is considered as sacred
as the fee simple of the whites.'""' 9 Citation to Tee-Hit-Ton appeared
only once in that decision, buried in a footnote. 160
In the 1985 decision of County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Na-
tion (Oneida II),"'1 the Court again emphasized the Walapai Tribe
rule that a tribal land claim does not depend on formal federal rec-
ognition for viability.'62 This time, moreover, the Court ignored Tee-
Hit-Ton completely.' 6' Unfortunately, while the Supreme Court ar-
guably has abandoned Justice Reed's approach, his ethnocentric
bias against Indians is echoed in the Vermont Supreme Court's ex-
tinguishment of Abenaki rights in Elliott.'6
156. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
157. Id. at 669 (quoting United States ex rel. Hualpai v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S.
339, 347 (1941) (Walapai Tribe)).
158. Id. at 670 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 516 (1832)).
159. Id. at 669 (quoting Walapai Tribe, 314 U.S. at 345 (quoting Mitchel v. United
States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835))).
160. Id. at 669 n.5. The footnote is merely a string citation of thirteen cases vari-
ously involving Indian land rights.
161. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
162. Id. at 236 (citing Walapai Tribe, 314 U.S. at 347, and Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 668-
69). The Oneida II Court also reiterated the "sacred as fee simple" language of Mitchel v.
United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835), and cited language from Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), indicating the "unquestioned right" of Indians to
their land. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 235.
163. See Newton, supra note 82, at 1284-85. Professor Newton hopes that this reluc-
tance to endorse the Tee-Hit-Ton analysis heralds its formal reconsideration by the Court.
Id. at 1284.
164. Justice Reed eyplained that American Indians were dispossessed "by the drive
of civilization." Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281 (1955). Similarly,
in Elliott, Justice Morse found that the Abenakis were dispossessed "by the increasing
weight of history." State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 218 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1258 (1993).
In order to understand the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, it is instructive to consider the
termination-era undertones of Justice Reed's view of American Indian history:
The American people have compassion for the descendants of those Indians who
1994] ABORIGINAL TITLE 99
E. The Requirement of a Plain and Unambiguous Act
The doctrine of aboriginal title has remained basically intact
from the Marshall Court era to the present with a few significant
alterations and additions. 165 The passage of time, however, forced
the Court to look into ever more remote periods of the nation's his-
tory to consider possible extinguishments.'6 This chronological dis-
tance made it necessary to devise a test to determine whether the
sovereign had, in fact, extinguished aboriginal title.
The first clear exposition of this test occurred in Walapai
Tribe,'67 which required the Court to determine whether aboriginal
title had been extinguished seventy-six years earlier. The first step
of the test was to determine the historic policy of the United States
toward American Indians and aboriginal lands.6 8 The Court found
that "[ulnquestionably it has been the policy of the federal govern-
ment from the beginning to respect the Indian right of occupancy. " 169
Policy settled, the second step was to search the historical re-
cord to find whether that protective policy had been expressly con-
travened by the sovereign. The Court determined that it would take
"plain and unambiguous action" by the sovereign to remove Indians
were deprived of their homes and hunting grounds by the drive of civilization.
They seek to have the the Indians share the benefits of our society as citizens of
this Nation. Generous provision has been willingly made to allow tribes to re-
cover for wrongs, as a matter of grace, not because of legal liability.
Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 281-82.
165. Newton, supra note 82, at 1226; see also Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra
note 52, at 47 (stating in 1947 that from the Marshall Court to the present "this body of
law never rejected its first principles").
Professor Newton describes four significant areas of change in the doctrine of abo-
riginal title: the sovereign's power to extinguish, the method of extinguishment, the con-
cept of split title, and compensation for Fifth Amendment takings by the United States
government. Newton, supra note 82, at 1226-32. Essentially, these areas of change are
concerned with Indian lands defined by treaty with the United States, federally recog-
nized tribes, or specific legislation dealing with the rights of a certain tribe. Id. Since the
Abenakis of Vermont fall into none of these categories, many of the variations in the abo-
riginal title doctrine do not pertain to them. The Abenaki case is involved with aboriginal
title based solely on aboriginal possession. No federal treaties or legislation cloud the pic-
ture.
166. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, is an example of this long-distance judicial task. In El-
liott, the Vermont Supreme Court was forced to determine whether extinguishment had
occurred more than 200 years in the past. Id. at 214.
167. United States ex rel. Hualpal v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
168. Id. at 345-46.
169. Id. at 345. Justice Douglas stated that this policy had been recognized con-
tinually since Johnson v. MHIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Walapai Tribe, 314 U.S.
at 345. Douglas then reiterated the proposition put forth in Mitchel v. United States, 34
(9 Pet.) 711 (1835), that the Indian right of occupancy was "as sacred as the fee simple of
the Whites." Walapai Tribe, 314 U.S. at 345.
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from the policy's protection. 170 The test was rigorous because, as the
Court stated, "extinguishment cannot be lightly implied" in light of
the government's duty to protect the welfare of Indians.17 The
Walapai Tribe Court upheld all other aspects of the aboriginal title
doctrine formulated more than a century earlier by the Marshall
Court.
In the 1985 Oneida II decision,172 the Court upheld and clarified
that rigorous standard. The Court stated that "congressional intent
to extinguish Indian title must be plain and unambiguous. 1
73
Ill. ANALYSIS OF STATE V. ELLIOTT
A. Introduction
While ostensibly relying on these traditional rules for deter-
mining extinguishment of aboriginal title in State v. Elliott, the
Vermont Supreme Court in fact violated both the letter and spirit of
these rules. First, the Vermont court declined to consider the com-
plete absence of Abenaki consent to the extinguishment of their
land. Second, it abandoned the search for a "plain and unambiguous
act" demonstrating the sovereign's intent to quash Indian property
rights. Instead, the court patched together a new rule to show extin-
guishment by a series of indeterminate historical events.
The Vermont court relied on the cumulative effect of historical
trends beginning in the 1760's to show that Abenaki title had been
terminated by 1791 when Vermont became the fourteenth state of
the Union. 74 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Morse held that
"[elxtinguishment may be established by the increasing weight of
history." 5 For the court, the salient historical events were the Brit-
ish Crown's implied consent to non-Indian settlement in the area,
the "zeal" with which pre-statehood Vermonters protected their land
grants, and the negotiations with Congress over Vermont's admis-
sion to the Union. 76 While none of these events individually could
rise to the level of extinguishment-and the court did not contend
170. Walapai Tribe, 314 U.S. at 346 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 354. The Court suggested that it was really looking for congressional in-
tent. Id. at 353-54. However, this was not a simple weighing of the public record. The
Court required the "plain and unambiguous act" in an effort to err, if at all, on the side of
the Walapais. Id. at 346. This was in keeping with a construction canon of federal Indian
law that "doubtful expressions... are to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless
people, who are wards of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection and good
faith." Id. at 354 (quoting Choate v. Trapp, 244 U.S. 665, 675 (1912)).
172. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
173. Id. at 247-48 (quoting Walapai Tribe, 314 U.S. at 346) (emphasis added).





that they did-the primary issue, as the court framed it, was
whether they, in totality, were sufficient.
B. British Policy in the Colonial Era
1. Introduction. According to the Elliott court, the first step to-
ward extinguishment was taken by the British Crown during Ver-
mont's colonial period. First, the Crown failed to enforce its express
prohibition against white settlement on Abenaki lands. Second, by
acting to resolve the dispute between New York and New Hamp-
shire over what is now Vermont, the Crown allegedly evinced an af-
firmative intent to appropriate Abenaki territory to itself.
In keeping with Walapai Tribe test, the Vermont Supreme
Court considered the policy of Great Britain which would reveal its
intent toward Indian tribes and the area in question.'77 Inexplicably,
however, the Vermont court departed from Walapai Tribe by stating
that the sovereign's Indian policy was not reflected in its laws and
official policy statements.178 Justice Morse disregarded the royal in-
structions, proclamations, and orders issued in the 1760's, 7 ' and
analyzed Great Britain's Indian policy in light of the unauthorized
actions of one royal governor, and the consequent actions of individ-
ual colonists.8 0 The Vermont court's reformulation of the test
thereby violates the doctrine of aboriginal title. It removes the focus
from the intent of the sovereign to the intent of actors who can have
absolutely no effect on aboriginal title.
2. British Policy Toward Aboriginal Lands. In 1761, the Crown
issued a Royal Instruction to its colonial governors forbidding them
to grant Indian lands to colonists.' 8 ' The Crown was concerned that
colonists who were taking land "illegally, fraudulently, and surrep-
titiously" from Indians would spark further bloody wars with the
militarily powerful tribes. 8 2 Wary of the "fatal effects which would
attend a discontent amongst the Indians, and being determined
upon all occasions to support and protect the said Indians in their
just rights and possessions," the Crown enjoined governors, on




181. Royal Instruction of Dec. 12, 1761, in 2 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH
COLONIAL GOVERNORS, 1670-1770, at 476, 477 (Leonard W. Larabee ed., 1935) (stating,
"[we] do hereby strictly enjoin and command that neither yourself or any lieutenant gov-
emor... pass any grant or grants to any persons whatever, of any land within or adja-
cent to the territories possessed or occupied by the said Indians or the property or pos-




threat of dismissal, from granting away Indian lands, and ordered
the governors to eject any squatters settled thereon.18
Nevertheless, on August 17, 1763, Governor Wentworth of New
Hampshire made three grants in what is now northwest Vermont, at
St. Albans, Highgate, and Swanton."M The Wentworth grants com-
prised land occupied by the Missisquoi Abenakis, 1  and coincide
with the lands claimed by the Abenakis in Elliott."8 6 These grants
clearly contravened the 1761 Royal Instruction.
Shortly after the grants were made, the Crown issued the Royal
Proclamation of 1763-an executive law which was the Crown's de-
finitive policy statement on Indian-colonial relations for the remain-
der of Britain's long colonial tenure in North America.187 The Royal
Proclamation reiterated the Royal Instruction's ban on land grants
in North American Indian territory, and its demand that governors
remove white squatters." The Royal Proclamation went further,
however, and set a demarcation line at the Appalachian Mountains,
which include the Green Mountain range running the length of
Vermont. The King forbade royal colonial governors from granting
lands west of these mountains 8 9 Far more than a policy statement,
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 had constitutional force as
"prerogative legislation" issued directly by the King in Privy Council
to bind his colonial governments.190 The district court found that it
183. Id.
184. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 215.
185. State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 68 (Vt. Dist. Ct., Franklin
Cir. Aug. 11, 1989).
186. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 215.
187. Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763, in 1 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CANADA, 1759-1791, at 163 (Adam Short & Arthur G.
Doughty eds., 1918).
188. Id. at 167.
189. Id. The actual language was "Lands beyond the Heads or Sources of any of the
Rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the North and North West." Id. The only
types of land transactions allowed beyond that point were voluntary cessions directly
from the native inhabitants to the British government. Id. at 167-68. The Proclamation
stated that "if at any Time any of the said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said
Lands, the same shall be purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some Public Meeting or
Assembly of the said Indians." Id. at 167. This policy underscored Britain's reliance on
the discovery doctrine with its twin requirements of sovereign transaction and consent.
The requirement that any Indian cessions be received in open meetings with representa-
tives of both sides present demonstrates a commitment to the consensual method of ex-
tinguishment.
190. See generally BRUCE A. CLARK, NATIVE LIBERTY, CROWN SOVEREIGNTY: THE
EXISTING ABORIGINAL RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 58-83 (1990) Clark de-
scribes "prerogative legislation" as "that body of law enacted by virtue of the king's pre-
eminent power to make law independently of statute and the courts." Id. at 58. It was
embodied in royal commissions and proclamations, issued under the great seal of Great
Britain, the terms of which were mandatory on colonial governors. Id. at 70. No colonial
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"functionally revoke[d]" the Wentworth grants, which granted lands
west of the Green Mountains.' 9 '
The Crown's purpose in issuing the two royal directives was to
protect the possessions of Indian tribes. 192 The Elliott court ostensi-
bly agreed with such a reading,9 3 but after weighing these executive
laws, rejected them as nothing more than "paper tigers."" It is from
the governor's ultra vires actions-continued support for settle-
ment-that the Elliott court draws its interpretation of British pol-
icy.195 The court noted that the New Hampshire governor did not
eject his grantees from their dubious landholdings after the Crown
issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763."96 Justice Morse cited this as
evidence that the Crown "impliedly consented" to extinguishment. 97
Further, he stated, the ultimate fact of non-Indian settlement in the
area demonstrated British policy goals. 9 ' However, the grants were
not actually settled until 1783, long after the end of British rule.'99
law was valid which conflicted with such proclamations, including the Proclamation of
1763. Id. at 73-76.
191. State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 69 (Vt. Dist. Ct., Franklin
Cir. Aug. 11, 1989).
192. See Royal Instruction of 1761, supra note 181, at 478 (expressing "determined
resolution to support [the Indians] in their just rights"); Royal Proclamation of 1763, su-
pra note 184, at 166 (stating that the Indians "should not be disturbed or molested" in the
possession of their lands).
193. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 218. The court explicitly refers to the royal directives as
"policy statements about preserving Indian occupation." Id.
194. Id. at 219.
195. Id.
The actual protective English policy toward Native Americans in northern New
England can also be determined from several other sources. See St. Francis, slip op. at 63-
72. The first is the Articles of Capitulation of 1760 which followed the French and Indian
War. Id. at 63. In that document, Great Britain promised that the tribes which had sided
with the French would not be disturbed in the possession of their lands, and that they
would be treated fairly and honorably. Id. at 63-64. Among those tribes were the Missis-
quoi Abenakis. Id. at 64. Britain further elaborated its Indian policy in the 1763 Treaty of
Paris which formally ended the French and Indian War. Id. The Abenakis received basi-
cally the same attention in this treaty as they had in the Articles of Capitulation. Id. The
royal directives to colonial governors in the 1760's continued this policy. Id. at 64-65.
That the British policy toward Indians was faithfully displayed by these pronounce-
ments is supported by Chief Justice Marshall in Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711,
744 (1835). The Supreme Court commented on the British policy:
One uniform rule seems to have prevailed from their first settlement, as ap-
pears by their laws; that friendly Indians were protected in the possession of the
lands they occupied, and were considered as owning them by a perpetual right
of possession in the tribe or nation inhabiting them, as their common property,
from generation to generation.
Id.
196. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 219.
197. Id. at 218-19.
198. Id. at 219.
199. State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 26 (Vt. Dist. Ct. Franklin
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Justice Morse thus used British failure to enforce the law, and
the fact of non-Indian settlement, as evidence of the intent to extin-
guish. To support the validity of this approach, he cited two federal
cases. He first relied on United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso00
for the proposition that opening up lands for non-Indian settlement
in an "appropriate factual context" can terminate Indian property
rights.20 ' Justice Morse claimed that the sovereign's recognition of
the inevitability of settlement constituted implied consent, and
therefore amounted to extinguishment. 202 However, on the facts pre-
sented, which were very similar to those in Elliott, the Ildefonso
court came to the opposite conclusion. The Ildefonso court held that
the sovereign's legislation "opening lands.., to white settlement
was merely an act in recognition of the inevitable western migration
and eventual settlement of white homesteaders [and] does not
translate into a present intention on the part of Congress to destroy
Indian title."203
Furthermore, the Ildefonso court found that the legislative
opening of lands to white settlement in the face of pro-Indian con-
gressional policy statements is not evidence of intent to extin-
guish.0 4 The "appropriate factual context" alluded to in Ildefonso,
then, would not support extinguishment of aboriginal title in El-
liott.205
Cir. Aug. 11, 1989).
200. 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
201. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 219. The Elliott court actually paraphrases the Ildefonso
rule and removes the original subjunctive form which makes the possibility of extin-
guishment by this method seem more doubtful. Instead of "making lands available
... constitute[s] termination," Elliott, 613 A.2d at 219, the original rule says "making
lands available could... constitute termination...." Ildefonso, 513 F.2d at 1389
(emphasis added).
202. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 219.
203. Ildefonso, 513 F.2d at 1389 (emphasis added). Another significant aspect of
ldefonso is that the court considered whether the Indians had consented to the claimed
extinguishment. Id. at 1388. The court determined that they had not. This consideration
is based upon the rule of consensual extinguishment. In Elliott, the Vermont court did not
consider the Abenaki attitude toward termination of their aboriginal title. In its argu-
ment, the state presented no evidence that the Abenakis had consented to extinguish-
ment.
204. Id. at 1388-90. The government, challenging aboriginal title, argued that a con-
gressional act had opened up indigenous areas for settlement. Id. at 1389. The court re-
jected this argument, stating that a national policy respecting aboriginal title was in ef-
fect throughout the period in question. Id. at 1388-90. This policy was evidenced by circu-
lars issued by the federal General Land Office in 1884, 1887, and 1903. Id. at 1389. The
first of these circulars, in language very similar to the British royal directives of 1761 and
1763, required that its field officers "peremptorily refuse all entries and filings attempted
to be made by others than Indian occupants upon lands in the possession of Indians." Id.
at 1389.
205. Id. at 1383. While the court explains what is not the appropriate factual context
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The Elliott court also cites Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community v. United States206 as supporting extinguishment by
settlement. Like Ildefonso, however, Gila River held that preparing
lands for white settlement analogous to the pattern in the Abenaki
case did not provide evidence of sovereign intent to extinguish-.2 7
Justice Morse borrowed a rule from Gila River that "authorized
white settlement is one factor in determining when Indian title
ceased."0 8 The operative word in that rule, however, is "author-
ized."20 9 Because Governor Wentworth's grants contradicted explicit
British law and policy toward tribal lands,210 they were not author-
ized by the Crown. In fact, Justice Morse concedes that the Went-
worth grants may not have been authorized, and were in violation of
the Royal Proclamation of 1763.212 The Gila River rule, which re-
for extinguishment (circumstances analogous to Elliott), it does not hint at what context
might be appropriate. It is curious, then, that the Vermont Supreme Court would rely on
ildefonso to support extinguishment in Elliott. It should be stated that Justice Morse did
not try to analogize the two cases. He only took the rule from Ildefonso, apparently disre-
garded its context, and tried to apply it to support extinguishment of aboriginal title in
Elliott. 616 A.2d at 213-14, 220.
206. 494 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
207. Id. at 1389-91. The Gila River court found that a congressional act simultane-
ously creating a smaller reservation and requesting land surveys for white settlement on
the larger tract of aboriginal land did not constitute extinguishment. Id. at 1389-91. Par-
ticular notice was paid to the fact that the congressional act did not explicitly refer to
termination of aboriginal title. Id. at 1390. Analogizing to Elliott, there was no mention of
aboriginal title in the congressional act admitting Vermont to the Union in 1791. Nor was
there particular reference to termination of aboriginal title in the Wentworth grants.
208. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 219. Justice Morse extends the rule to reiterate that "in an
appropriate factual context the opening up of an area for settlement can be tantamount to
the ending of aboriginal title over the whole region." Id. This is the argument put forth in
reference to the Ildefonso rule. Id. However, tacking it on to the Gila River rule does not
give it additional weight.
209. See Gila River, 494 F.2d at 1389-91 (dismissing unauthorized white settlement
as having no impact on aboriginal title).
210. See supra notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
211. See also United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 728 (1832) (holding
that grants by royal governors were presumably valid in the absence of "disavowal, revo-
cation or denial by the king.") The Court also stated that a king's royal order is the su-
preme law and supersedes all previous inconsistent orders. Id. at 714. Based on these
holdings, Judge Wolchik found that "the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the 1764 Royal
Order functionally revoke Wentworth's grants." State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr,
slip op. at 69 (Vt. Dist. Ct., Franklin Cir. Aug. 11, 1989).
212. Justice Morse concedes that "Wentworth's grants of the lands at issue may not
have been authorized by the Crown, but any ultra vires exercise- of power by him does not
detract from the vast political changes it inspired." Elliott, 616 A.2d at 218. (emphasis
added). He further concedes that the royal directives "may have declared the grants inva-
lid based on a lack of jurisdictional authority." Id. The Elliott court, in effect, denies any
legal effect to the royal directives, although it appears that they invalidated the grants
absolutely.
19941 105
106 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
quires "authorized" settlement,2 13 is then inapplicable to the Abenaki
case.
By framing the policy in terms of what the sovereign failed to
do, and by disregarding the strenuous policy statements, the Ver-
mont Supreme Court essentially shifted the burden of proof to the
Indians. According to the judicially constructed rules of extinguish-
ment, the burden is on the party challenging aboriginal title to dem-
onstrate the sovereign act and intent. 4 The proper burden alloca-
tion in Elliott would have been on the state to show that the British,
through their affirmative acts, clearly intended to extinguish aborig-
inal title. For their part, the Abenakis should only have needed to
show that they had inhabited the land, exclusive of other tribes,
from time immemorial. 5 Under Vermont's test, however, the
Abenakis were required to demonstrate the fact of Britain's accom-
plishment of its policy goals, an impossible task under the circum-
stances. 6
It is particulary disturbing that the Vermont court would
summarily dismiss the Royal Proclamation of 1763, given the widely
acknowledged critical importance of that policy statement. The
Royal Proclamation was the expression of a mercantilist and anti-
expansionist consensus in the British Ministry at Whitehall. With
213. Gila River, 494 F.2d at 1391.
214. United States ex rel. Hualpai v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941)
(Walapai Tribe). Once aboriginal title is established, as it was in the case at bar, the pre-
sumption is with the American Indians that extinguishment has not occurred. Id.
"Extinguishment cannot be lightly implied." Id. at 354. In order to overcome this pre-
sumption, the challenger must show the clear intent of the sovereign, evidenced by a
"plain and unambiguous" action. Id. at 346.
215. Id. at 345. See also St. Francis, slip op. at 4 (holding that archeological evidence
showed that the Abenaki and their forbears had been in continuous possession of their
land in northwest Vermont at least as far back as 9300 B.C.).
216. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 218-19. The court emphasized that no grantees were in fact
displaced as a consequence of the royal directives. Id. Presumably, this was the proof of
policy integrity for which the court was looking.
The Vermont Supreme Court accepted the argument that Britain intended to ac-
complish the polar opposite of what it had expressed in "policy statements about preserv-
ing Indian occupation." Id. at 218. While it was shown that Britain did not realize its
policies to protect American Indians, this is not evidence that Britain intended not to
realize them. It is difficult to understand why the Crown would invest effort into issuing
orders that it intended to sabotage all the while. The court offers no guidance here.
One possible explanation might be that Britain hoped the directives would pacify the
irate American Indians. However, given the cultural gulf between Europeans and Ameri-
can Indians at the time, it is doubtful that the British would think such a ruse would
work. It is hard to imagine the British colonial bureaucracy believing that the tempers of
an overwhelmingly illiterate people would be salved by issuing sophisticated policy
statements addressed to colonial governors. It seems more logical to assume that the
British intended their policy statements to form policy, unless proven otherwise.
217. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Jefferson, the Norman Yoke, and American Indian
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it, the Crown intended to create an exclusively Indian pale of set-
tlement beyond the Appalachians.21 This would have served the
dual purpose of sustaining the profitable Indian trade in the north-
west without diluting British mercantile economic power on the
eastern seaboard.1 Furthermore, the Crown had hoped the creation
of a reserve would reduce friction and prevent costly Indian wars in
the northwest after its hard-won and exhausting 1763 victory in the
French and Indian War.' °
British commonwealth jurisprudence further emphasizes the
Royal Proclamation's importance. While commonwealth courts from
Canada to Australia have long debated whether the King's Procla-
mation of 1763 actually created aboriginal title or simply confirmed
its existence, none doubted that Britain intended it to be the
authoritative policy statement on the protection of aboriginal
lands.2 '
Despite the enduring impact of the Royal Proclamation, the
Vermont Supreme Court rejected it as a superfluous contrivance.222
The court equated Britain's failure to resolutely enforce its stated
policy with an affirmative intent to contravene that policy. The
Crown missed "opportunities to... preserve aboriginal rights," a
failure which Justice Morse interpreted as an endorsement of set-
tlement.2 3 But searching for missed opportunities of policy enforce-
ment, or for lack of action, is a corruption of aboriginal title doctrine.
Lands, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 170-72 (1987).
218. Id. at 172 (stating that this "policy of racial apartheid" was not rooted in
delusions of racial superiority, but rather was meant to protect British economic inter-
ests).
219. Id. at 171 (explaining that colonial policy was affected by powerful mer-
cantilists at Whitehall who promoted the production of British manufactured goods and
their sale abroad in exchange for Indian-hunted furs). The mercantilists tried to thwart
the opening of the western frontier, fearing that this would lead to inland manufactures
which would lessen the American and Indian dependence on British imports. Id.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., St. Catherines Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 14 App. Cas. 46,
54 (P.C. 1888) (stating that aboriginal title in Canada depends on the declaration of such
rights in the Royal Proclamation of 1763); Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141,
206 (N.Terr. 1971) (using the Proclamation to support the propostition that aboriginal ti-
tle in Australia does not arise from common law but must be created by legislation or de-
cree of the European sovereign).
But see, e.g., Calder v. Attorney-General for British Columbia, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 173-
74, 190-210 (Can. 1973) (stating that aboriginal title in Canada does not owe its existence
to the Proclamation, but springs from a pre-existing right of possession); Mabo v.
Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1992) (overruling Milirrpum; recognizing "common law
native title").
See also R.D. Lumb, Aboriginal Land Rights: Judicial Approaches in Perspective, 62
AUST'L. L.J. 273 (1988).
222. State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 219 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993).
223. Id.
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For extinguishment, the doctrine requires that the sovereign take
"plain and unambiguous action" indicating the intent to contravene
its stated policy of preservation.2
By holding that the ultimate fact of white settlement exposed
the real intent of sovereign policy to extinguish, Justice Morse cir-
cumvents reference to historical policy statements. The fact that the
Crown did not consent to the Wentworth conveyances, acted to
invalidate them, and finally, evinced plain and unambiguous intent
to preserve Indian lands, are no obstacles to an "increasing weight of
history" rule.
The Elliott court also held that the mere fact that the Crown
sought to resolve the border dispute between the colonies of New
Hampshire and New York 225 demonstrated its intent to "appropriate
the area."22 This circular argument suggests that because Britain
was in the business of colonizing, it certainly intended to extinguish
aboriginal rights in all of its territory.227 This argument is closely
related to the conquest by discovery theory Justice Reed advanced in
Tee-Hit-Ton.2" But, like Tee-Hit-Ton, it also contradicts the purpose
of aboriginal title doctrine, which is, at least in part, to protect the
Indians' right of occupancy.2 9 The mere fact of colonization in the
224. United States ex rel. Hualpai v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1941)
(Walapai Tribe); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985)
(Oneida 17).
225. The question of the Wentworth grants' validity had been further confused by
the fact that the New Hampshire governor was giving away the New York governor's
land. See Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593 (1933). Purposely or not, Governor
Wentworth misread his territorial jurisdiction, and claimed that the colony of New
Hampshire extended west to the Hudson River, where it bordered New York. Id. at 599.
Shortly after Governor Wentworth made the grants in what is now northwestern Ver-
mont, the governor of New York granted the same land to other colonists. Elliott, 616
A.2d at 218. To solve the ensuing disputes, Britain issued the Royal Orders of 1764 and
1767. Id. at 215-16. The former set the border between New Hampshire and New York at
the Connecticut River, which is now the eastern border of Vermont. Because the Went-
worth grants at issue were far west of the Connecticut River, they fell squarely within
New York's territory. Id. See also State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 26
(Vt. Dist. Ct., Franklin Cir. Aug. 11, 1989) (noting that although the Royal Order of 1764
did not explicitly mention the Wentworth grants by name, scholars interpret the Order as
invalidating the grants because it set the New Hampshire boundary far to the east). The
latter Royal Order attempted to quiet the dispute by forbidding the two governors from
making any more grants until further notice. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 215.
226. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 219.
227. Id. Justice Morse argued that "[t]he necessary and inevitable outcome of the
Crown's position would still be that Europeans would appropriate the area, especially
since settlement of the lands was a British goal during this time." Id. The court took this
conclusion from its own historical research. It was outside the record from the trial and
could not be contested by the defendants.
228. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955). See discussion
supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (noting that the doctrine of ab-
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area shows neither the proper consent nor sufficient intent to extin-
guish. °
As for native consent, Justice Morse never -addressed it. Be-,
cause the weight of history is presumed to run counter to the
Abenakis' desire to retain-their land, Justice Morse's rule negates
the need to consider Indian consent..
C. Vermont's Independent Period
For the purposes of finding extinguishment, the Vermont court
located the second historically significant period as the years from
1777 to 1791.1 During this time, Vermont was nominally independ-
ent. It had not been one of the original thirteen colonies, nor clearly
a part of one. 2 After the outbreak of the American Revolution,
Vermont existed in a kind of limbo until it was admitted to the Un-
ion as the fourteenth state in 1791. During this era, Vermont de-
clared itself an independent "Republic."33 Vermont's 'Declaration of
Independence" stressed its reliance on the grants by Governor
Wentworth." 4 The grants formed the land basis of what was to be-
come the State of Vermont."
The Elliott court put a great deal of emphasis on the actions of
the Republic of Vermont toward extinguishment of Abenaki land
rights."6 Only a sovereign can extinguish aboriginal title, however,
and the Elliott court declined to bestow sovereign status on the Re-
public.27 The doctrines of discovery and aboriginal title are abso-
original title is based partly on Vitoria's philosophy of respect for Indian sovereignty and
property rights).
230. See United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
231. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 220.
232. See CHARLES T. MORRISSEY, VERMONT: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 77-80 (1981),
for a discussion of ambiguous status of colonial-era Vermont.
233. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 216.
234. See id., at 216-19. The Wentworth grants were jealously guarded by the origi-
nal grantees, despite their apparent invalidity. Id. In 1770, a group of grantees began
what amounted to a revolution against the authority of New York Governor Cadwallader
Colden. Id. at 216. Led by the legendary Ethan Allen, the "Green Mountain Boys" drove
many of the New York grantees out of Vermont. Id. His parting words to them were,
"Go ... and complain to that damned scoundrel your Governor. God damn your Governor,
Laws, King, Council, and Assembly." Id. at 216-17 (quoting MORRISSEY, supra note 232,
at 83).
235. See Elliott, 616 A.2d at 218. In negotiations with the federal congress, Vermont
delegates made clear their reliance on the Wentworth grants. Id. at 220. As a condition
for admission to the Union in 1791, the Republic of Vermont settled New York's claims to
the land with a payment of $30,000. Id. at 217.
236. Id. at 217.
237. Id. at 220. "Without deciding whether Vermont legitimately achieved sover-
eignty, we believe that the period from 1777 to 1791 provides continuity in the longstand-
ing appropriation of the area that had been granted by Wentworth." Id. (citation omitted).
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lutely inflexible in the rule that only a sovereign can extinguish
aboriginal title. There is no room for judicial discretion on this point.
Without a decision that the Republic of Vermont was a sovereign
from 1777 to 1791, any actions taken by its government or its citi-
zens should be regarded as entirely irrelevant to the question of ex-
tinguishment. Justice Morse cites no authority for his holding that a
political entity which is not a sovereign can extinguish aboriginal
title. The proposition that the Republic had the power to extinguish
aboriginal title, then, is at best unfounded.
Regardless of this hurdle, the Elliott court went on to hold that
the "zeal" of the Vermonters in defending the Wentworth grants was
a crucial factor in the extinguishment of Abenaki title. 213 According
to Justice Morse, the nature of these grants was inimical to contin-
ued Abenaki occupancy.3 9 The grantees who "ardently" relied on the
grants thus acted to assert dominion over the land.240 The grantees'
intent to extinguish Indian title, said the Elliott court, was disposi-
tive." 1 Justice Morse claimed that Governor Wentworth's dubious
authority to make the grants in the first place was not relevant to
the question of extinguishment. 4 2 By focusing on the intent of the
grantees, who were private parties, Justice Morse stands aboriginal
title doctrine on its head. Under that doctrine, the sovereign and the
American Indian occupants are the only parties whose intent mat-
"We concede that the period preceding Vermont's statehood was a confusing era, and that
valid questions remain as to the legitimacy of the opposing governing entities." Id, at 221.
238. Id. at 218. See also Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. C1. 487 (1967).
Lipan also concerned a pre-state Republic, Texas, and its zeal to extinguish aboriginal ti-
tle. The Lipan court held that none of the following acts were evidence of intent to extin-
guish: the Republic's Senate's nullification of Indian treaties, id. at 494; explicit public
statements by the President of the Republic advocating expulsion of hostile Indians and
relocation of friendly ones, id.; and the Republic's legislative act calling for surveys of In-
dian lands in anticipation of settlement. Id. at 494-95. The court found that because the
Republic had not terminated aboriginal title with these actions, the title endured into the
statehood period. Id. at 496.
The court also operated under the explicit assumption that the Texas Republic was a
legitimate sovereign, and thus actually had the power to extinguish. See id. at 491-92.
Such was not the case in Elliott, where the court expressed doubt that the Vermont Re-
public was truly a sovereign. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
Ironically, Lipan is one of the few aboriginal title cases that mention the role of his-
tory. Here, history did not favor the Republic. "On the whole of the available materials,"
the court said in dicta, "we must conclude that history is decidedly against the [United
States]." Lipan, 180 Ct. Cl. at 496.
239. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 219-20.
240. Id. at 220.
241. Id. Justice Morse stated that, "[i]n short, the relevant focus is on what
Vermonters intended to do with the land, not what hindsight discloses Governor Went-
worth was authorized to do with it." Id.
242. Id.
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ters. A3 Indeed, the doctrine has served repeatedly as a bulwark to
keep private parties, like the Wentworth grantees, from entering the
equation.2 " To entertain the expectations of private grantees while
ignoring the invalidity of the Wentworth grants completely negates
the doctrine of aboriginal title. In fact, it legitimizes the disposses-
sion of Indians by settlers, a practice that the doctrine was meant to
prevent. Private actors can have absolutely no effect on aboriginal
title, regardless of their "zeal."
The Elliott court did not hold that the separate actions of Ver-
monters between 1777 and 1791, in and of themselves, constituted
extinguishment of Abenaki title. 5 Rather, it held that this period
was part of a historical extinguishment process, beginning in 1763
and continuing until 1791." The court states that whatever ambi-
guity on extinguishment existed after the "Republic" period events
was removed by Vermont's statehood negotiations with the United
States.247
D. Vermont's Admission to the Union
The Elliott court stressed the importance of the congressional
admission of Vermont to the Union for two reasons." First, it in-
volved the official, affirmative imprimatur of an undeniable sover-
eign. Second, it brought together the two other historically signifi-
cant events: the British intent to assert dominion and the Vermont
Republic's "zeal.""9 The court held that the third event, admission to
243. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (only the sovereign can extin-
guish); notes 110-11 and accompanying text (extinguishment requires Indian consent).
244. See Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 52, at 49 (stating that Chief Jus-
tice Marshalls decision in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) helped to
protect Indians from the pressures of land-hungry settlers). The doctrine would also pro-
tect Indians against grantees in that it would force the sovereign to formally extinguish
the lands before possessory interests could vest in the grantee. Id.
245. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 220.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. A third reason may be that this act was the first and last time Congress was
involved in any action affecting Abenaki title. The records from Elliott and St. Francis do
not show any contention or alternative theories on the state's part that the United States,
after 1791, had any intent to extinguish.
After Vermont became a state in 1791, the United States was the only entity that
could have any effect on existing aboriginal title in Vermont. In the absence of any con-
gressional act to extinguish from 1791 to the present, aboriginal title in Vermont could
not be extinguished. The state, anxious to prove extinguishment, would have to rely on
the act of admission if there was no subsequent evidence of intent to terminate aboriginal
rights.
249. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 220. Justice Morse stated that 'Vermont's admission to the
Union provided closure to a long period of authority transferred from one body politic to
another, giving final, official sanction to the previous events, and eliminating any remain-
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the Union, was so unequivocal as to remove any doubt regarding the
first two.Y°
Justice Morse reasoned that the congressional intent to extin-
guish aboriginal title in Vermont was informed by ten years of ad-
mission negotiations with Vermonters.2.' During that time, the
Vermont negotiators had stressed the validity of the Wentworth
grants and their reliance on them. 2 The Elliott court held that the
Vermont negotiators must have represented the grants as being in-
herently contrary to possessory interests of the Abenakis. Therefore,
according to the court, it was clear that Congress intended the
Wentworth grants to be unencumbered by aboriginal title upon
Vermont's admission in 1791.2 3
As it had with regard to the Republic period, the court here re-
lied on the intent of the private grantees and not on that of the sov-
ereign.2 The Elliott court substituted the Vermonters' intentions to-
ward the grants for that of Congress. Justice Morse's opinion pro-
vides no evidence that Congress believed or even understood the
Vermont negotiators' alleged representations concerning the grants.
No such evidence was introduced at trial. No expression of congres-
sional intent to extinguish Abenaki title is presented, directly or in-
directly, in the act admitting Vermont2 5 or anywhere in the Elliott
opinion .s
This in itself demonstrates the absence of the required plain
and unambiguous sovereign act. Moreover, the evidence of congres-
sional policy available cuts in the opposite direction. There is, for
ing ambiguity about who had dominion over lands once controlled by the Abenakis." Id. at
221.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 217
252. Id.
253. Id. at 220-21.
254. See id. at 220 (stating, without citation, that "Congress recognized the land
claims based on the representations of the grantees, which cannot be harmonized with
the contention that the grantees possessed only the 'naked fee'").
255. Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. 73, 1 Stat. 191 (1791). That this Congress knew how to
dispose of Indian lands cannot be disputed. Two weeks after it passed the Act admitting
Vermont to the Union, Congress passed an Act expressly vesting title in white settlers to
the former lands of the Piankeshaw Indians. Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 93, sec. 3, 1 Stat.
221 (1791).
256. The court states that the admission negotiations are extensively described in
Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593, 608-13 (1933), and that reference to that case
clearly demonstrates Congress's understandings of the nature of the grants. Elliott, 616
A.2d at 220. However, in that case, the United States Supreme Court is concerned pri-
marily with Vermont's eastern border with New Hampshire and on which bank of the
Connecticut River it rests. There is no reference to the Wentworth grants. In fact, refer-
ence to Vermont v. New Hampshire sheds no light on Congress's understanding of the na-
ture of eighteenth-century land grants in Vermont.
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example, the congressional policy statement in the Northwest Ordi-
nance." Concerning Indians, the Ordinance states, "their lands and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and
in their property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or
disturbed," except in a "just" war."5 Justice Morse also could have
turned to legal precedent in Justice Douglas' opinion in Walapai
Tribe: "[u]nquestionably it has been the policy of the federal gov-
ernment from the beginning to respect the Indian right of occu-
pancy." 9 In judging congressional policy toward aboriginal lands
and intent to extinguish, these plain and clear statements over-
whelm the congressional silence on the issue in negotiations or legis-
lation regarding Vermont's admission to the Union. The Elliott court
does not point to a "plain and unambiguous action" that is evidence
of congressional intent to extinguish."' The fact that Congress ad-
mitted Vermont as a state does not in itself reflect congressional in-
tent to extinguish. If it is assumed that Congress intended to extin-
guish aboriginal title by the mere act of admitting a state, no abo-
riginal title would survive in the United States. 6
E. Cumulation of Ineffective Acts
The Elliott court, of course, did not hold that any of the sepa-
rate acts of Great Britain, Vermont, or the United States, in and of
themselves, constituted extinguishment of Abenaki titleY.26  Rather,
it held that each was part of a historical process of extinguishment
that began with the Wentworth grants in 1763 and ended with Ver-
mont's admission to the Union in 1791Y.26 However, if these actions
are themselves each without legal significance according to the doc-
257. Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
258. Id. at 52. Article III of the Northwest Ordinance states:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians, their lands
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their
property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in
just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and
humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to
them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.
Id.
259. United States ex rel. Hualpal v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941)
(emphasis added).
260. See id. at 346, 353; County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,
247-48 (1985).
261. See Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487 (1967) (holding that,
despite the Texas Republic's unfriendly and even hostile acts toward the native holders of
aboriginal title, the Republic's actions did not rise to the level of extinguishment, and that
aboriginal title survived the admission to the Union).
262. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 221.
263. Id.
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trine of aboriginal title, it is difficult to see their significance when
taken as a group.
The Elliott court cites two cases to support its holding that the
congressional act of admission can finalize a series of questionable
extinguishment acts.2 4 In both cases, however, the final congres-
sional act was an explicit affirmative action clearly intended to cir-
cumscribe aboriginal rights. In United States v. Gemmill, Congress's
plain and unambiguous action was its payment to an Indian tribe
for its interest in its land.265 In Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community v. United States, the deciding congressional action was
the successive creation of federal Indian reservations. 266 The Gem-
mill court held that a "century-long course of conduct" 267 could extin-
guish aboriginal title only where the final act demonstrated unam-
biguous congressional intent to do so.2 6 Although invoked by Justice
Morse for the Elliott court, this rule does not support the result in
Elliott, because no sovereign demonstrated a plain and unambigu-
ous intent to extinguish Abenaki land rights. Only one of the acts-
admission to the Union-involved an affirmative, although ambigu-
ous, act by a sovereign. Finally, none of the acts explicitly refer to an
intent to extinguish Indian land interests.
Justice Morse also invokes Ildefonso for this same reason. The
Ildefonso court appeared to hold that extinguishment could be cu-
264. Id. (citing Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 494
F.2d 1386 (Ct. C1. 1974); United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976)).
265. Gemmill, 535 F.2d at 1149. In Gemmill, the court referred to a series of federal
actions culminating in the federal payment to the Pit River Indians for the land. Elliott is
not analogous because the acts previous to the final federal act were not committed by a
sovereign. Id. The Vermont court declined to call the Vermont Republic a sovereign. El.
liott, 616 A.2d at 220. The initial act-British policy-was not an act at all, but rather an
omission. Id. at 215-19. The affirmative British acts of issuing royal directives to protect
aboriginal title indeed contradicted the alleged act. Id.
It is interesting to note that the following federal actions against the Indian lands in
question did not reach the level of extinguishment: concentrated federal military actions
against the Pit River Indians resulting in their defeat; attempts to move the Indians onto
a reservation; and congressional inclusion of the disputed lands into a national forest.
Gemmill, 535 F.2d at 1149. These actions would indicate a sovereign intent contrary to
aboriginal rights much more clearly than does the act of merely admitting Vermont into
the Union.
266. Gila River, 494 F.2d at 1391-92. In Gila River, one act of Congress failed to
reach the level of extinguishment because it did not explicitly mention Indian lands. The
court found that because "n]othing is said [in the act] about extinction of Indian title or
cutting off Indians from the areas they were using," the act could not be interpreted to
extinguish aboriginal title. Id. at 1389.
If this test were imposed in the Elliott case, the act of admission to the Union would
surely fail to extinguish.
267. Gemmill, 535 F.2d at 1149.
268. Id.
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mulative.269 The Ildefonso court held that, where encroachment is
gradual and the native inhabitants are dispersed over many years, a
date for the extinguishment may be assigned to settlers' entry under
public land laws.270 In Ildefonso, however, the actual fact of extin-
guishment was not contested." The tribes were petitioning only for
an increase in the valuation of their "taken" land which the govern-
ment was obligated to pay them for; they acknowledged that title
had been extinguished long ago. 2 It was not for the court to decide
whether the government had extinguished aboriginal title, simply
when it had happened, given that it had. In fact, the Ildefonso court
held that none of the acts claimed by the government amounted in-
dividually to extinguishment. Nevertheless, since "we must have a
date in order to place a value on the property taken,"273 the court
upheld the Indian Claims Commission's "practical" finding that an
"average" of the proposed dates would suffice. 4 The context of the
Ildefonso case-an appeal from the Indian Claims Commission to set
an extinguishment date-limits its applicability to Elliott for de-
termining extinguishment.
The Supreme Court in Walapai Tribe also discouraged the con-
cept of cumulative extinguishment.275 In that case, the Court faced a
series of congressional and executive acts, each of which was argu-
ably adverse to Indian rights. 6 Rather than consider the series as a
whole, however, the Court examined them individually on legal
merit. If one event was found not to accomplish extinguishment, the
Court discussed it no further, and moved on to the next event. Jus-
tice Morse, on the other hand, lumped a series of non-extinguishing
events together. However, he never adequately explained why the
questionable merit of one legal argument should be bolstered by the
fact that it is related to several other questionable arguments.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusion
Justice Morse's "increasing weight of history" rule achieves an
end run around the settled law of aboriginal title. Aboriginal title
doctrine is comprised of a set of rules, easy in comprehension: only
the dominant sovereign can extinguish; to do so it must take a plain




273. Id at 1390.
274. Id.
275. United States ex rel. Hualpai v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
276. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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and unambiguous action demonstrating intent; and the native occu-
pants must consent to the extinguishment. The Vermont court's
rule, however, evades these principles altogether.
The Elliott court's evasion -of the sovereign intent requirement
is clear from its allegation of British intent to extinguish Abenaki
title. The court'completely disregarded the facts that the Crown did
not consent to the Wentworth grants, acted to invalidate them, and
finally evinced the unambiguous intent to preserve Indian lands. It
dismissed the Royal Proclamation of 1763 as empty rhetoric, when
in fact it was a sharp policy statement grounded in British economic,
political, and moral philosophy.277 The policy's failure may reflect
poorly on British political will, but there is no evidence that the
Crown intended to sabotage its own express policy.
The Vermont court erroneously substituted sovereign "implied
consent"278 for affirmative intent to extinguish. As the Supreme
Court held in Walapai Tribe and Oneida II, implied consent cannot
effect extinguishment. The sovereign must instead take "plain and
unambiguous action" demonstrating intent to extinguish. 279 By
substituting implied consent, the Elliott court completely negated
the need to find sovereign intent through the historical record. The
actions of Governor Wentworth and the ultimate fact of white set-
tlement in Missisquoi-against the demonstrated sovereign intent-
replaced the intent inquiry. When a court is left to determine extin-
guishment by its selective reading of history rather than by legal
standards, it can always find implied consent to extinguish where
the sovereign did not achieve its stated goal of preserving Indian
lands.
While the "increasing weight of history" rule led to a corruption
of the sovereign intent requirement, it completely precluded consid-
eration of the other crucial element of aboriginal title doctrine-In-
dian consent. This is particularly apparent when contrasted with
the correct aboriginal title doctrine approach taken in the Abenaki
case by the state district court. At the six-day trial, the defendant
Abenakis introduced exhaustive historical and ethnological evidence
of their perseverence in Missisquoi. 0 As Judge Wolchik stated, "[aill
expert testimony is that of the defense; the State called only police
officers."8 1 The judge's ninety-six page opinion was filled with his-
torical background, both Indian and white, and his conclusions were
277. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
278. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 219.
279. Walapai Tribe, 314 U.S. at 346; County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470
U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985) (Oneida I).





based on a fair weighing of both.282 The Vermont Supreme Court,
however, credited only one version of history. In an opinion thick
with the historical actions of Great Britain, Vermont, and the
United States, Justice Morse dedicated barely four sentences and a
footnote to the history of the Abenakis.m
The Vermont court's abandonment of the Indian consent re-
quirement derives chiefly from Justice Douglas' "conquest" dicta in
Walapai Tribe.' While the opinion in Walapai Tribe actually rein-
forces the historical importance of Indian consent, it also contains
statements implying that extinguishment can validly be accom-
plished independently of Indian will." The engimatic Tee-Hit-Ton
case took these dicta to an intolerable extreme in stating that the
Indians had been validly dispossessed "by the drive of civiliza-
tion." 6 Nevertheless, the Marshall Court cases clearly limited the
power of extinguishment to sovereign acceptance of voluntary In-
dian land cessions. Those cases are universally recognized as com-
prising the doctrine of aboriginal title and are still good law. They
are, however, in complete opposition to the Vermont court's finding
of valid dispossession of natives "by the increasing weight of his-
tory." The Vermont court's use of extraneous conquest dicta should
not be accepted as a substitute for the requirement of Indian con-
sent.
The Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of aboriginal title
to strike a balance between the competing interests of the American
Indians and the sovereign under whose dominion they had fallen.
Elliott has thrown this balance heavily into the favor of the sover-
eign. The Vermont Supreme Court relied on the "increasing weight
of history" to help it circumvent the rules of extinguishment of ab-
original title. The Elliott court abandoned the rules of Indian con-
sent and sovereign intent for a decision based merely on the ulti-
mate fact of white settlement. The "weight of history" test is not a
test but a conclusion which holds that the conquerors will always
win.
282. Id. at 1-36.
283. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 214.
284. United States ex rel. Hualpai v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).
Walapai Tribe is used in both Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281
(1955), and United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1976), to support
the proposition that consent is not necessary for extinguishment. Tee-Hit-Ton and
Gemmill, together with Walapai Tribe itself, are then cited by the Elliott court for the
same proposition. Elliott, 616 A.2d at 213.
285. For a discussion of Walapai Tribe, see supra notes 122-32 and accompanying
text.




The "increasing weight of history" rule enunciated by the Ver-
mont Supreme Court should not be allowed to displace the tradi-
tional requirements of aboriginal title doctrine. If followed by other
courts, the rule would hamstring Indian tribes in asserting their
interests. Other jurisdictions considering extinguishment of aborigi-
nal title should take the opportunity to expressly reject Elliott as an
unsound departure from long-established doctrine. In doing so,
these courts should reconfirm the basic tenets of the aboriginal title
doctrine as laid out by the Marshall Court: tribal consent and so-
vereign intent for its extinguishment.
The fact that the United States Supreme Court declined to hear
the Abenakis' appeal may be something of a blessing to the propo-
nents of aboriginal title. This confines the "increasing weight of his-
tory" rule to Vermont's borders. There is no immediate danger that
the Supreme Court will become victim to the same pitfalls into
which the Vermont court stumbled in misconstruing the doctrine of
aboriginal title.
However, the fame of the case has already spread throughout
Indian country."' Practitioners of Indian law and tribal leaders are
concerned that Elliott will become an oft-cited precedent in future
litigation over aboriginal title."' Litigants in aboriginal title cases
should keep the Elliott decision in mind as an example of the poten-
tial for judicial misreading of the rules regarding aboriginal title. By
vigorously advocating for reliance on the aboriginal title doctrine's
basic tenets, practitioners may prevent other courts from reproduc-
ing the Elliott court's dangerous mistakes.
287. Interviews with Nell Newton, Professor of Indian Law at American University
Washington College of Law, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 10, 1993); Steve Tullberg, Attorney,
Indian Law Resource Center, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 16, 1992); Bruce Duthu, Associate
Professor of Indian Law, Vermont Law School, Member of Houma Tribe of Louisiana
(Oct. 30, 1992).
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